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ABSTRACT 
This Article presents an original empirical methodology to identify 
which patent laws will best promote optimal incentives to innovate for 
society. Vociferous debates over patent reform pit the United States’ 
largest innovation industries against each other in a dispute concerning 
whether stronger or weaker patent rights are necessary to promote 
innovation. Past efforts to answer this question have been thwarted by an 
inability to parse the impossibly complex social and legal relationship 
between innovation and patent law. Rather than considering such 
problems directly, the proxy technique introduced here offers a new 
framework to leverage indirect signals that capture better information 
than previously available concerning how best to promote incentives to 
innovate. In certain contexts, it is possible to use empirical information 
about the trade-off between the incentives and exclusivity costs of patent 
law to identify particular private industries that (1) face trade-offs 
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equivalent to those that society faces, and (2) possess far superior 
information concerning how best to balance such trade-offs. Where 
industries satisfy both criteria, their private preferences will happen to 
align with social innovation objectives and can be mined for previously 
untapped, socially beneficial information. The proxy signal approach 
provides a new public choice methodology, designed to leverage the 
strength of collective private industry and market knowledge, in a manner 
that can be applied to other legal domains beyond patent law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Vociferous patent reform debates have sprawled across the judiciary, 
Congress, and the Executive Branch for the past dozen years. The most 
recent iterations of the disputes center on the newly enacted America 
Invents Act
1
 and recent Supreme Court decisions in Mayo v. Prometheus,
2
 
Microsoft v. i4i,
3
 and Bilski v. Kappos.
4
 Ironically, adversaries on all sides 
of these patent debates agree on their normative objective: to design a 
patent system that will optimize the incentives to innovate for society.
5
 
The parties disagree, however, on what form of patent law will achieve 
this treasured goal. Will ratcheting up patent protection generate greater 
incentives to drive technological advance, or create barriers to access that 
stifle future innovation? Will weakening patent protection make complex 
innovation no longer worth the effort, or produce a more open, synergistic, 
and generative innovation environment? 
Trying to parse the relationship between patent law and innovation 
presents an extremely challenging question. Innovation is a complex social 
phenomenon involving significant uncertainty, varied creative and 
motivational influences, and convoluted spillover and feedback dynamics, 
all of which are difficult to measure or predict. Layered on top of the 
social phenomena of innovation is the complex legal system of patent law, 
muddying the analysis even further. It is not surprising that the myriad 
efforts undertaken to understand the effects of the patent system have 
produced a mass of information, but limited awareness concerning 
whether any given legal change actually promotes or retards innovation.
6
 
This Article introduces a novel empirical methodology designed to 
identify which patent laws will best promote incentives to innovate for 
society, and where patent law currently stands in relation to providing 
optimal incentives to innovate. This method is based on confronting 
complex social welfare issues from a new direction. Instead of trying to 
evaluate the relationship between patent law and innovation directly, this 
 
 
 1. H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 2. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 3. Microsoft v. i4i Ltd. P‘ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). 
 4. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 5. See infra Part I.B. 
 6. ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (2011); Dan L. Burk & Mark 
A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1581 (2003); FRITZ MACHLUP, 
STUDY OF THE U.S. SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS: AN 
ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 79–80 (1958). 
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methodology develops an original public choice approach that captures 
private market and industry innovation information to indicate how patent 
incentives can be optimized. 
The most fundamental question in patent law, on which both 
proponents and opponents of patent reform agree, concerns how to 
identify the level of patent protection that will optimize the incentives to 
innovate for society.
7
 Too little protection reduces incentives to invest 
resources and to innovate in the first instance. But, too much 
propertization creates its own barriers to innovation, stifling the further 
development and dissemination of innovation products. Patent law seeks 
the level of protection that balances the trade-off between the benefit of 
incentives and the cost of limiting access so as to produce the greatest net 
incentives to innovate for society.
8
 
Conventional patent analysis involves attempting to measure and 
balance the well-recognized trade-off between incentives and exclusivity 
directly.
9
 Decades of effort appear to establish that we cannot accomplish 
this task. Rather than attempting to identify laws that produce optimal 
trade-offs directly, the framework introduced here develops a method that 
instead relies on indirect signals to indicate where current law stands in 
relation to the optimum. This method uses empirical information about the 
characteristics of innovation in different industries to identify particular 
private entities that both (1) face trade-offs equivalent to those that society 
faces as a whole, and (2) possess far superior information concerning how 
best to balance such trade-offs. Where private entities satisfy both criteria, 
their private preferences will happen to align with social objectives. In 
these select situations, private preferences can be leveraged as proxies to 
obtain previously unrecognized, socially beneficial information about how 
to best design the law. 
This proxy signal approach involves four general steps: first, 
identifying structural industry characteristics that affect a private 
 
 
 7. See infra Part I. 
 8. See Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1293–94 (describing the goal of patent 
protection as desiring to balance the incentives of the promise of exclusive rights against cost of 
exclusivity); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (describing 
intellectual property as requiring ―a difficult balance between the interests of authors and inventors in 
the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society‘s competing 
interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand.‖); Richard A. Epstein, 
The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal Response to A Premature Obituary, 
62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 458–59 (2010) (―Figuring out how to trade off exclusive ownership that gives 
strong incentives for commercialization against the free but uncoordinated use of information . . . 
offers the single greatest challenge to preserving the health of the law of copyrights and patents.‖). 
 9. See infra Part I.B. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss1/1
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industry‘s preferences with respect to patent law; second, evaluating which 
industry characteristics will tend to cause an industry to face the same 
incentive and exclusivity trade-offs as society; third, selecting industries 
with trade-offs that mirror the socially desired balance (i.e., industries that 
are proxies for social incentive objectives); and fourth, evaluating the 
selected industries‘ legal preferences, such as by studying their legislative 
and judicial advocacy efforts, to obtain indirect proxy signals concerning 
socially beneficial law. These steps are described in more detail below. 
Step One. It is now well recognized that different industries interact 
with the patent system in widely different manners. This variation arises 
due to differences in industry innovation characteristics. Some industries 
(e.g., pharmaceuticals) require costly research and development to 
innovate; others (e.g., software) do not.
10
 Some industries (e.g., 
semiconductors) have many alternatives to patent protection to profit from 
their innovation; others (e.g., medical devices) do not.
11
 Because industries 
vary in their innovation characteristics, they also vary in how they are 
affected by the incentives and exclusivity costs of patent law.
12
 This 
variation, in fact, is exactly why the country‘s most powerful technology 
industries have been locked in a decade-long battle over patent reform.
13
 
Step Two. Innovation routinely produces both positive external 
spillovers and negative external limitations on access. Due to these 
innovation externalities, most industries do not face socially optimal 
incentives to innovate, but instead are incentivized to desire stronger or 
weaker patent protection than is socially optimal.
14
 The industry 
innovation characteristics identified in Step One can be evaluated to 
determine which industries have characteristics that tend to produce 
relatively fewer innovation externalities. These industries will face 
incentive versus exclusivity trade-offs that are more similar to society as a 
whole. Whether an industry is a net producer or net consumer of 
innovation provides an illustration. Society as a whole desires patent law 
that balances the production and consumption interests in innovation: we 
 
 
 10. Burk & Lemley, supra note 6, at 1581–83. 
 11. Wesley Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and 
Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not) (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
7552 (2000)). 
 12. See infra Part III.D. Patent law currently provides, and is required to provide in certain 
respects under international law, relatively uniform doctrine across different areas of technology. This 
Article begins with a presumption of uniform patent law, a presumption that is relaxed later in the 
discussion. See infra Part III.F.3. 
 13. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN 
SOLVE IT 4, 100–02 (2009). 
 14. See infra Part II.A.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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cannot consume innovation that we do not produce, and we do not want to 
pay more to use innovation than the minimum amount necessary for its 
production.
15
 Private industries, however, do not necessarily balance 
producer and consumer interests. Some industries need relatively few 
patented inputs in order to produce and commercialize their own 
innovation. Such industries will face relatively low exclusivity costs from 
patent protection, but may receive particularly high benefits. 
Consequently, these industries would tend to favor stronger patent 
protection than is socially optimal. Other industries are in the opposite 
position. 
Step Three. Some industries may happen to face, due to their particular 
innovation characteristics, socially balanced trade-offs between the 
production and consumption of innovation. That is, these industries need 
about the same value of innovation as inputs (consumption) as the value of 
innovation that they develop as output (production). Such industries will 
tend to prefer, for purely self-interested reasons, intellectual property law 
that balances the production and consumption interests in innovation. 
Consequently, these industries will desire, to a first order approximation, 
similar patent protection to that which society desires for this balance. 
Though this example only covers a single innovation characteristic (the 
production versus consumption of innovation), it provides a flavor for the 
analysis. In practice, multiple characteristics affect the incentives and 
exclusivity costs of patent protection, requiring the evaluation of private 
industry trade-offs versus societal trade-offs across a variety of 
technological, innovation, and market characteristics. 
In essence, this process can be seen as a search for industries with few 
innovation externalities with respect to patent law. Industries with 
innovation characteristics that generate significant positive externalities (in 
the form of innovation spillovers), or negative externalities (in the form of 
limitations on access), with respect to innovation will tend to have patent 
law preferences that diverge significantly from societal preferences. 
Industries with few innovation externalities—those that take into account 
all of the positive benefits and spillovers from innovation, as well as all 
the limitations on access and costs of exclusivity produced by patent 
protection—will more closely parallel society‘s preferences. These 
―naturally internalized‖ industries can produce valuable proxy signals.16 
 
 
 15. Extraterritorial effects make this analysis more complicated, as a jurisdiction may actually be 
a net producer or net consumer of innovation due to the net export or net import of innovation. See 
infra Part III.F.6. 
 16. Maximizing net incentives to innovate is not precisely the same as maximizing social welfare 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss1/1
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Step Four. Identifying industries that face similar trade-offs to society 
produces valuable signals because private industries possess vast, superior, 
and previously untapped information concerning the relationship between 
innovation and intellectual property law.
17
 Not only does private industry 
have better information than public actors about innovation, as it engages 
in the innovation process directly, but private industry also better 
understands the relationship between innovation and patent law because it 
devotes substantial resources to examining this interaction. Competitive 
markets effectively require this outcome, as firms that are better able to 
manage this relationship will have a greater chance of succeeding in the 
market. The patent system is premised on this presumption. If public 
entities possessed equivalent information to industry concerning the 
relationship between investment and innovation, innovation could simply 
be publicly funded and made freely available.
18
  
By investigating the preferences of industries that face similar 
intellectual property trade-offs to society, such as through studying these 
industries‘ legislative and judicial lobbying efforts, it is possible to 
indirectly obtain proxy signal information concerning the socially optimal 
level of patent protection. This information has never been captured 
before. Though this proxy approach requires significant data and analysis, 
it is still substantially more feasible than prior efforts to identify socially 
beneficial patent law. This is because proxy analysis is based upon 
evaluating technology and innovation characteristics, objective 
characteristics on which society possesses substantial empirical 
information, rather than requiring a relatively inchoate and seemingly 
irresolvable exploration of the direct relationship between law and 
innovation. Instead of relying on public actors to try to guess at the 
interaction between law and innovation, proxy analysis provides a way for 
public lawmakers to indirectly leverage the private warehouse of industry 
and market knowledge on innovation.
19
 In this manner, proxy signals 
 
 
from innovation, but it is a common surrogate and these objectives are usually considered close. 
Analysis later in this article explains how differences between the two could be bridged. See infra 
notes 200–02 and accompanying text. 
 17. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Producing Law for Innovation, in RULES FOR GROWTH: 
PROMOTING INNOVATION AND GROWTH THROUGH LEGAL REFORM 23 (2011) (discussing the 
advantage of private markets for processing vast amounts of information and responding to complex 
issues). 
 18.  See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE 
MIND 4–7 (2008) (discussing how the intellectual property system creates and decentralizes the 
development of information and innovation).  
 19. See Hadfield, supra note 17, at 26 (arguing for harnessing the decentralized and market-
based incentives of the private market for legal benefit). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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provide a new means of public choice that can uncover useful information 
about how to design the law. 
Proxy signaling represents a new way to think about social welfare 
analysis. Proxy analysis integrates collective private knowledge across 
varied entities and industries engaged in the innovation process. This 
collection of private and market knowledge about the relationship between 
innovation and patent law will be far greater than its individual constituent 
parts. This technique is based upon the same concept that lies behind the 
success of crowd-sourcing and futures markets, but applies the concept to 
the law.
20
 This new approach for identifying socially optimal legal rules 
can be generalized in certain regards to solve complex trade-off questions 
in other legal domains. Many legal questions concern how to balance 
competing objectives in a complex environment where it is extremely 
difficult (and often impossible) to directly parse the relationship between 
social welfare and the law. For example, trying to optimize the trade-off 
between the harm of accidents and the cost of precaution, or the trade-off 
between the risk of unregulated financial markets and the cost of 
regulation. Though trade-off questions are highly contextual, and proxy 
analysis is not applicable in all legal fields, where it can be implemented it 
will provide a valuable new tool for improving the law. 
This Article introduces proxy signal analysis using patent law as an 
example. Part I presents the challenge of balancing the trade-off between 
innovation incentives and exclusivity costs in patent law. Part II explicates 
the proxy signal methodology. Part III applies the proxy approach to 
patent law to identify which industries possess socially parallel innovation 
characteristics, and analyzes the signals produced by such industries to 
indicate how to achieve socially beneficial patent law. Analysis of the 
America Invents Act and recent Supreme Court decisions provide 
examples of the promise of proxy signal analysis. The Article concludes 
with a discussion of how proxy analysis can be refined to take into account 
distributional concerns and applied beyond patent law to other legal 
domains. 
I. INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
Though proponents and opponents of patent reform disagree vigorously 
over how patent law affects innovation, they agree that patent law has a 
 
 
 20. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE (2006); 
JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND 
HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESSES, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES AND NATIONS (2004). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss1/1
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significant effect on innovation activity.
21
 Without intellectual property 
protection, many potential innovators would have limited prospect of 
profit from their innovations, lowering incentives to innovate in the first 
instance, and lowering innovation overall. Intellectual property protection, 
however, is a dual-edged sword. Intellectual property rights not only 
provide incentives, they also limit access to patented products, reducing 
the distribution of innovation and the potential for future technological 
development.
22
 
Patent law seeks to balance these competing trade-offs so as to 
maximize the net incentives to innovate for society.
23
 The following 
sections consider this incentive versus exclusivity trade-off in greater 
depth and examine past attempts to identify the optimal balance between 
them.
24
 
A. The Relationship between Patent Law and Innovation 
Patent rights simultaneously provide an incentive to innovate and 
reduce access to current and future innovation. The former presents a 
potentially great social benefit; the latter a potentially great social cost. 
Patent law‘s incentives to innovate include not just the direct potential of 
supracompetitive profits, but also a number of other benefits that have 
been identified, including the opportunity for firms to signal their 
 
 
 21. Robert Cooter et al., The Importance of Law in Promoting Innovation and Growth, in RULES 
FOR GROWTH: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND GROWTH THROUGH LEGAL REFORM 3 (2011) 
(discussing empirical work showing that innovation is the most important factor of production for 
economic growth in the United States); Burk & Lemley, supra note 6, at 1576 (―Patent law is our 
primary policy tool to promote innovation.‖). 
 22. See David S. Abrams, Did TRIPs Spur Innovation? An Analysis of Patent Duration and 
Incentives to Innovate, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1613, 1615 (2009); Robert P. Scotch & Richard R. Nelson, 
On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990); see also Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229 (2010) (―These [patent validity] limitations serve a critical role in 
adjusting the tension, ever present in patent law, between stimulating innovation by protecting 
inventors and impeding progress by granting patents when not justified.‖). 
 23. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293–94 (2012); 
F.M. Scherer, The Economic Effects of Compulsory Patent Licensing, in NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 
MONOGRAPH SERIES IN FINANCE AND ECONOMICS 84 (1977) (―The problem of patent policy is to 
strike a balance: enough protection to sustain a desired flow of innovations, but not superfluous 
protection in view of alternate incentives for innovation and the social burdens monopoly power 
imposes.‖); JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, 
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 11–12 (2008) (identifying the goal of maximizing net 
incentives to innovate). 
 24. This analysis is based on a widely-accepted utilitarian approach to patent law. BURK & 
LEMLEY, supra note 13, at 66–67 (2009) (―[T]heories of patent law based on moral right, reward, or 
distributive justice . . . are hard to take seriously as explanations for the actual scope of patent law.‖). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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technological strength,
25
 reduce transaction costs,
26
 and price-coordinate.
27
 
If patent rights are too limited or too weak, potential innovators will face 
suboptimal incentives to invest resources and time in innovation-
producing activities in the first instance.
28
 Too little innovation will occur. 
If patent rights are too expansive or too strong, however, potential 
innovators may face reduced incentives to innovate as well.
29
 The grant of 
patent rights affects the value and feasibility of future innovation because 
it increases the cost of using the intellectual property of others, due to 
greater licensing and litigation expenses, and reduces incentives for 
follow-on improvement innovation, as any potential profit must now be 
shared.
30
 In addition, greater propertization can increase the likelihood of 
property thickets and anticommons effects,
31
 each creating costs that 
reduce the benefit of, and incentives for, innovation. 
Somewhere between the extremes of no patent incentives and 
excessive barriers to access lies a level of propertization that can maximize 
the net incentives to innovate for society. While maximizing innovation by 
optimizing incentives is not precisely the same as maximizing the social 
welfare from innovation, it is a commonly used surrogate and sufficient 
for our purposes at this point.
32
 In trying to optimize the trade-off between 
incentives and exclusivity, increases in the level of patent protection have 
 
 
 25. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 627–28 (2002). 
 26. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, 12–13, 318–25 (2003). 
 27. Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
615, 619–20 (2000). 
 28. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 23, at 11. 
 29. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126–27 (2006) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (―Sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than ‗promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts.‘‖) (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
 30. Jonathan M. Barnett, Property As Process: How Innovation Markets Select Innovation 
Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 407 (2009); Scotch & Nelson, supra note 22, at 839, 886–88; WILLIAM 
D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 76 (1969). 
 31. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard 
Setting, 1 INNOVATION POL‘Y & THE ECON. 119 (2000); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698–700 
(1998). 
 32. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 23, at 11–12. Burk & Lemley, supra note 6, at 1597–99. The 
actual social welfare produced by innovation would be extremely difficult to measure. Abrams, supra 
note 22, at 1616. The goal of optimizing incentives also may have effects on the types of innovation 
that are incentivized. The conclusion of this Article discusses how the proxy signaling approach could 
be applied to broader questions of social value, including which kinds of innovation are incentivized. 
In addition to equitable considerations, maximizing the net incentives for innovation does not 
necessarily produce an optimally efficient system. Certain inefficiencies in a proprietary patent system, 
such as consumer dead weight losses from imperfect price discrimination and system administration 
expenses are not cured by optimal incentives. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss1/1
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two primary effects: they increase the incentives for innovators to innovate 
due to the potential for greater supracompetitive profits (thus increasing 
innovation activity), and simultaneously reduce incentives to innovate due 
to the grant of greater exclusive rights to others (thus reducing innovation 
activity). Starting from a point of low patent protection, so long as the 
marginal benefit from increased incentives outweighs the marginal cost of 
greater exclusionary rights, increasing patent protection will increase 
incentives to innovate on the whole. As patent rights increase, however, 
the marginal benefit of increased incentives will tend to get smaller (due to 
decreasing returns to scale),
33
 while the marginal cost of exclusionary 
rights will tend to increase (due to the increased transaction costs of the 
network effects of greater exclusivity).
34
 As a result, the relationship 
between a given level of patent protection and the corresponding net 
incentives or value of innovation produced by that level of propertization 
will have an inverted-U form, as represented in Figure 1.
35
  
I(p)optimal
weaker stronger
I(p)
Poptimal
Intellectual Property Protection (P)
FIGURE 1. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND INNOVATION
In
no
va
tio
n
δI(p) = Ø
δp
 
 
 
 33. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 258 
(2007) (noting the decreasing returns to scale of incentives). 
 34. See Barnett, supra note 30, at 411 (noting that as propertization levels increase, marginal 
transaction costs accelerate). 
 35. See Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property’s 
Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 932–33 (2010) (presenting a similar approach); Jonathan Barnett, 
Do Patents Matter? Empirical Evidence on the Incentive Thesis, in HANDBOOK ON LAW, 
INNOVATION AND GROWTH 178 (Robert E. Litan ed., 2011) (presenting cross-country evidence for 
an inverted-U relationship); Nancy T. Gallini, The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. 
Patent Reform, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 131, 136–39 (2002) (discussing empirical support for an inverted-U 
relationship). 
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Patent law regimes towards the left side of Figure 1 represent weaker 
propertization, commons approaches; regimes towards the right side 
represent stronger propertization, exclusivity approaches. Given any level 
of patent protection (P), the net incentives for innovation produced by that 
level of protection is denoted by the function I(p). The innovation 
function‘s maximum, labeled Poptimal in Figure 1, represents the level of 
propertization that will maximize the total net incentives to innovate for 
society.
36
 At Poptimal the marginal benefit of increased incentives is exactly 
equal to the marginal cost of greater exclusion.
37
 Beyond this ―sweet spot,‖ 
increases in the strength of patent protection tend to reduce net innovation 
incentives as the marginal cost of exclusionary rights outweighs the 
marginal benefit of increased incentives.
38
 
In practice, we may never be able to allocate rights to precisely achieve 
the optimal level of incentives.
39
 In fact, even if society found itself 
exactly at the optimal level, it is unlikely that we would know.
40
 In the real 
world, laws can neither be set nor evaluated with the mathematical 
precision of a model. Even if we could achieve the optimal level 
momentarily, critical real world context, including innovation and 
industries, evolve dynamically, so the optimal target will change over 
time. Given this imperfect reality, the proxy signal methodology provides 
new means to achieve a first order understanding of where current law lies 
in relation to the optimum and how to move towards that optimum at a 
given time. As discussed later in the article, this approach can function 
dynamically so that as the optimum allocation of patent rights evolves, the 
signals obtained can evolve concurrently. 
Figure 1 depicts the strength of patent protection as a single metric, 
displayed along its x-axis. In practice, any given level of patent protection 
is made up of a number of components, including the scope, duration, and 
 
 
 36. See Abrams, supra note 22, at 1615 (explaining that the ―optimal patent term is the point at 
which the marginal benefit from increased innovation is exactly offset by the marginal cost of the 
deadweight loss created by the patent right.‖). 
 37. Stated mathematically, δI(p)/δp = 0 at Poptimal. 
 38. See Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 
123 (2006) (―[I]ntellectual property grants are desirable to the extent that they encourage new product 
development at a reasonable cost.‖). 
 39. Because innovation is a public good, even defining the socially optimal level of incentives to 
innovate is a complex task. See BRETT FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF 
SHARED RESOURCES 53–57 (2012) (discussing challenges of pursuing optimality for public goods).  
 40. See, e.g., B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, Product Differentiation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 723, 760 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989) (noting in 
a comparable market context that ―we believe that we would be quite unable to recognize an optimum 
if we saw one‖). 
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enforceability of patent rights.
41
 Sometimes, strengthening certain 
elements, while weakening others, could produce a socially superior patent 
regime, though it may be unclear whether such a regime represents 
―stronger‖ or ―weaker‖ propertization. One can imagine a more complex, 
multi-dimensional version of Figure 1 that takes into account these 
different components, in which the innovation function is no longer a two-
dimensional curve, but a multi-dimensional form. For purposes of initial 
explanation, it is convenient to conceptualize patent propertization 
strength as ordered along a single dimension, considering each point along 
the axis to represent a set of patent rights, involving, for example, 
particular scope and duration of rights.
42
 This simplification is for ease of 
introduction only, and is not necessary for proxy signal analysis.
43
 
Finally, although Figure 1 happens to display the optimal level of 
propertization towards the middle of the function, proxy analysis makes no 
a priori assumptions about whether a highly commons-oriented or highly 
propertized legal regime is preferable, or whether something in between 
might be better. Similarly, the proxy approach is also agnostic about where 
existing legal regimes lie in relation to the social optimum. Whether 
current patent law provides too strong or too weak propertization, for 
example, the same method can be applied to produce signals concerning 
how to best refine the law.
44
 
B. Conventional Approaches to Optimizing Patent Rights 
Academics and other experts in many fields have spent decades trying 
to understand where the sweet spot of patent protection lies in order to 
 
 
 41. See Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 35, at 932 (making this point with respect to several 
aspects of intellectual property protection); John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. 
L. REV. 505, 526 (2010) (listing a number of components of patent rights). As a formal matter, the 
scope of patent rights can be defined to include both the validity standards and enforceability of patent 
rights, leaving two primary dimensions of propertization: the scope and duration of rights. Suzanne 
Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 29, 38 (1991). 
 42. See Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 35, at 933 (making the same assumption). In 
mathematical terms, I(p) = I(pa, pb, pc . . . ), where pa might represent the scope of patent rights, pb the 
duration of patent rights, pc the enforceability of patent rights, and so on. 
 43. Applying the proxy signal approach to multi-component patent rights regimes requires 
identifying localized maxima within a multi-dimensional set of rights. Because the proxy approach 
depends on identifying industries that mirror social preferences, however, application to a multi-
dimensional set of rights is not significantly more complicated than the one-dimensional approach 
described here. 
 44. It is theoretically possible that patent rights trade-offs could present a multi-peaked social 
value function, which would require modification of the proxy signal method introduced here, though 
this possibility seems unlikely in practice. 
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achieve the optimal level of incentives. There have been many ambitious 
and creative attempts to solve this complex empirical problem. Past and 
ongoing efforts include advanced conceptual frameworks,
45
 complex 
theoretical models,
46
 comparisons of innovation across jurisdictions with 
differing intellectual property protection,
47
 and studies of changes in 
innovation due to changes in intellectual property laws over time.
48
 
Though these approaches include many extraordinarily sophisticated 
endeavors, each is unable to identify the optimal level of patent protection 
for at least one (and usually multiple) of the following reasons: (1) they 
cannot sufficiently take into account all the real world factors influencing 
innovation and incentives,
49
 (2) they cannot identify or control for the 
pertinent factors that influence innovation in real world studies,
50
 or 
 
 
 45. E.g., Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 31; Merges & Nelson, supra note 30; Scotchmer, supra 
note 41; Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 
276–77 (1977). 
 46. E.g., James Bessen & Eric Maskin, Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation, 40 RAND 
J. ECON. 611 (2009); Robert Hunt, Patentability, Industry Structure, and Innovation, 52 J. INDUS. 
ECON. 401 (2004); Partha Dasgupta & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Uncertainty, Industrial Structure and the 
Speed of R&D, 11 BELL J. ECON. 1 (1980); NORDHAUS, supra note 30. 
 47. E.g., Petra Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from Nineteenth-
Century World Fairs, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1214 (2005); Josh Lerner, Patent Protection and Innovation 
over 150 Years (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8977, 2002), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8977; ERIC SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL PATENTS: 
THE NETHERLANDS, 1869–1912, SWITZERLAND, 1850–1907 (1971). 
 48. E.g., Aaron A. Kesselheim, Using Market-Exclusivity Incentives to Promote Pharmaceutical 
Innovation, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED.1855 (2010); Abrams, supra note 22; James E. Bessen & Robert 
M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 157 (2007); Moser, 
supra note 47, at 1216; Mariko Sakakibara & Lee G. Branstetter, Do Stronger Patents Induce More 
Innovation? Evidence from the 1988 Japanese Patent Law Reforms, 32 RAND J. ECON. 77 (2001); 
Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369 (1994). 
 49. See Abrams, supra note 22, at 1616–25 (discussing the difficulty of measuring innovation); 
Bessen & Maskin, supra note 46, at 614–27 (providing one of the most sophisticated economic models 
to date, but noting inaccurate assumptions that no firms own patents ex ante and that the social value 
of an invention is known); Scotchmer, supra note 41, at 32–40 (discussing the difficulty and lack of 
information for evaluating the pioneer versus improver balance of rights in conceptual models); Peter 
S. Menell, A Method for Reforming the Patent System, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 487, 
488–89 (2007) (providing a laundry list of some of the factors that would need to be taken into account 
in an economic model of optimizing patent protection). Simplifying assumptions are, in fact, one of 
the hallmarks and benefits of economic modeling. See Colin F. Camerer, Behavioral Economics, in 
WORLD CONGRESS OF ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY PROCEEDING 6 (T. Persson ed., 2011), available at 
http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~camerer/index.htm.  
 50. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE-MARKET INNOVATION MACHINE: ANALYZING THE 
GROWTH MIRACLE OF CAPITALISM 296 (2002) (noting difficulty with measuring or establishing the 
cause of innovation); SCHIFF, supra note 47, at 43, 51, 102–06 (noting problems with measuring 
innovation and with comparing real world studies across time or jurisdiction); Abrams, supra note 22, 
at 1615–19, 1640–41 (noting problems with evaluating exogenous effects on innovation and with the 
data used to measure innovation); LERNER, supra note 47, at 7, 28 (noting problems with data used to 
measure innovation); G. M. PETER SWANN, THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION: AN INTRODUCTION 35–
36 (2009) (describing limitations of various approaches to measuring innovation). 
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(3) they consider only a limited area of innovation.
51
 Though we have 
learned much about innovation and patent law from these efforts, 
including a variety of data that is relied upon in the following analysis, our 
understanding of the relationship between innovation and law remains 
frustratingly inconclusive.
52
  
This uncertainty can have significant ramifications for intellectual 
property policy. Though the political economy of intellectual property law, 
as with other areas, is difficult to parse, the lack of an objective 
understanding of the relationship between patent law and innovation likely 
makes it easier for special interest lobbying to hold even greater sway over 
lawmaking than it otherwise would.
53
 Where most industry players unify 
behind a particular change, as has been the case in ratcheting up copyright 
protection over time, such changes tend to become law.
54
 Where industry 
 
 
 51. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 22 (concentrating on the pharmaceutical industry); Kesselheim, 
supra note 48 (same); Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, Don’t Fence Me In: Fragmented Markets for 
Technology and the Patent Acquisition Strategies of Firms, 50 MGMT. SCI. 804 (2004) (semiconductor 
industry); Bessen & Hunt, supra note 48, at 157 (software industry). 
 52. ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (2011) (referring to balancing 
the costs and benefits of intellectual property as ―impossibly complex‖); Abrams, supra note 22, at 
1641 (―Understanding the incentive effects of patent protection is a core issue in intellectual property 
scholarship, about which almost nothing is currently known.‖); Burk & Lemley, supra note 6, at 1581 
(―Rather than resolve the debate over how well the patent system works, [legal and economic 
scholarship] has painted a more complex picture.‖); Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, 
Economic Theories about the Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J. ECON. ISSUES 1031, 1051 (2000) 
(conducting a literature review of patent analysis covering forty years and concluding, ―our lack of 
knowledge here clearly limits our ability to analyze intelligently the current pressing issues of patent 
reform‖); George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual Property, 8 RES. L. 
& ECON. 19 (1986) (―[I]n the current state of knowledge, economists know almost nothing about the 
effect on social welfare of the patent system or of other systems of intellectual property.‖); FRITZ 
MACHLUP, STUDY OF THE U.S. SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & 
COPYRIGHTS: AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 79–80 (1958) (―No economist, on 
the basis of present knowledge, could possibly state with certainty that the patent system, as it now 
operates, confers a net benefit or a net loss upon society.‖). 
 53. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 25 (2004), available at http://www.pralmeida.org/04Temas/11academia/05materiais/ 
07LandesPosnerPolEcIntProp.pdf (using public choice theory to explain how industry-group pressure 
may ratchet up intellectual property protection despite uncertainty as to whether an increase is socially 
beneficial); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900–
2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2235–36 (2000) (discussing the heavy industry interest group role in 
drafting and passing intellectual property legislation); William F. Patry, Copyright and the Legislative 
Process: A Personal Perspective, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139, 141–42 (1996) (discussing the 
heavy industry role in copyright legislation). 
 54. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law Intellectual 
Property, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1543, 1546 (2010); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 53, at 25; GARY D. 
LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 27 (1989) (noting that the political influence of 
industry groups depends in part on their homogeneity); see also Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The 
Political Economy of the Patent System, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1341 (2009) (discussing the influence of 
lobbying on patent legislation). 
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players are divided, as has been the case in the patent reform debates, there 
is often legislative deadlock on the change.
55
 In neither case is there any 
significant legitimate sense concerning whether the change is good for 
innovation or society overall.
56
 The result is often inefficient law. Or, at 
least, we think it is. Without understanding the relationship between 
innovation and law in the first instance, we cannot know whether the law 
is socially optimal or not. This is hardly a model of public choice. 
The inability of existing analysis to resolve the relationship between 
innovation and law is an almost necessary consequence of using 
conventional law and economics approaches to try to evaluate this 
interaction directly. Because the relationship is so complex and contextual, 
it is impossible to take all pertinent factors into account or to convey 
lessons from one situation and time to another.
 57
 This project provides an 
alternate perspective to better investigate these long considered problems, 
developing different means to parse the seemingly insurmountable 
challenge of the complexity of the real world interaction between 
innovation and intellectual property law. 
II. PROXY SIGNALS: CAPTURING PRIVATE INFORMATION FOR PUBLIC 
BENEFIT 
Proxy signal analysis presents a new mechanism for public choice by 
introducing an original empirical framework to evaluate where current 
doctrine stands in relation to socially preferable legal rights. Most prior 
law and economics efforts to analyze rights balancing questions, including 
those discussed above, take a top-down approach. These strategies attempt 
to directly assess the social welfare produced by legal doctrine so as to 
identify the optimal level of rights and mold the law accordingly. Other 
efforts use a bottom-up approach, attempting to aggregate private 
preferences in order to calculate their social combination. Both prevailing 
law and economics strategies effectively try to identify the relationship 
between social welfare and the law directly. 
Proxy signal analysis provides a third way to conduct law and 
economic analysis. This approach carefully selects industry proxies whose 
 
 
 55. See, e.g., Balganesh, supra note 54, at 1592–93; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 13, at 100–
02. 
 56. LIBECAP, supra note 54, at 11 (discussing rent-seeking in bargaining over property rights 
and the lack of attention to overall social effects). 
 57. See MACHLUP, supra note 52, at 79–80 (―The best [any economist studying the patent 
system] can do is to state assumptions and make guesses about the extent to which reality corresponds 
to these assumptions.‖). 
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private preferences are expected to structurally mirror the actual 
relationship between the law and social welfare. The proxy signal method 
presents means to uncover private market information that indirectly 
signals socially superior legal regimes. This technique is based on the 
realization that in certain contexts public lawmakers can more accurately 
evaluate industry characteristics pertinent to a desired social trade-off than 
they can evaluate social welfare directly. This situation will occur where 
public entities possess significant information concerning characteristics 
that shape industry preferences, but lack direct information concerning 
how to best promote an underlying social policy. Such situations arise in 
many circumstances for a variety of reasons, including from the 
informational asymmetry between the public sector and private industry, a 
lack of accurate pricing signals for the provision of public goods, or other 
circumstances where the market fails to provide accurate information 
concerning the social demand for laws. This indirect proxy approach uses 
the actions of real world actors who possess desired information to detect 
signals that can help shape the law. Rather than succumbing to the 
difficulty in much economic analysis of trying to fit an economic model to 
the complexity of the real world, the technique presented here takes 
advantage of the brilliant intricacy of real world variation as a tool. The 
following sections present the conceptual framework for proxy signal 
analysis. 
A. The Externalities of Innovation 
Like most private activities, the private economic value and the social 
economic value of innovation diverge. This divergence is the result of 
externalities. Because innovators generally cannot capture the full social 
value of their innovation, innovation produces positive externalities. 
Conversely, because innovators often need not pay the full cost of 
exclusivity produced by patenting an innovation, innovation can produce 
negative externalities.  
Positive externalities refer to benefits produced by a private 
individual‘s activities for which the individual is not fully compensated.58 
In the case of innovation, positive externalities are legion. The positive 
externalities, or spillovers, of innovation include third-party benefits from 
the chance to improve upon an innovation (and profit thereby), the 
opportunity for others affiliated with innovation to learn from an 
 
 
 58. Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 33, at 262. 
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innovation and transfer that know-how to other projects, and the benefit of 
consumer surplus for consumers who are able to acquire innovation 
products at a price lower than their absolute willingness to pay.
59
 As a 
result of these positive externalities, innovators often cannot privately reap 
the full value of innovation, and consequently may not be incentivized to 
engage in the socially optimal level of innovation-producing activity in the 
first instance.
60
 
Conversely, negative externalities refer to costs imposed by a private 
individual‘s actions for which the individual does not have to pay.61 
Environmental pollution is a classic example of a negative externality. 
Polluters often do not pay the full health, medical, and environmental costs 
of pollution, and therefore may engage in more polluting activity than is 
socially optimal.
62
 Negative externalities also exist for innovation as a 
result of patent protection. Most significantly, innovators do not have to 
pay the full exclusivity costs produced by their patent rights. Patent 
owners are largely immune from the limitations on access and restraints on 
future innovation produced by their patent rights, including those 
produced by their patents‘ contribution to property thickets, anticommons 
problems, and uncertainty, such as in the scope of the patent rights.
63
 As a 
result of negative externalities, innovators and patent owners may engage 
in greater exclusionary-producing activity than is socially optimal.
64
 
Due to positive and negative innovation externalities, innovators 
usually do not face socially optimal incentives to innovate.
65
 Were a 
 
 
 59. FRISCHMANN, supra note 39, at 303–04; Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 33, at 268; 
James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Research on Patent 
Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 6 (2005). 
 60. Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 33, at 262; BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 59, at 6. Of 
course, individuals innovate for a variety of reasons, including intellectual curiosity and challenge, and 
personal or professional respect or reward. See, e.g., Roberta R. Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: 
The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1946 (2006). Analyzing 
the difference between private value and social value due to externalities requires taking these effects 
into account. 
 61. Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 33, at 262. 
 62. Adam B. Jaffe et al., A Tale of Two Market Failures: Technology and Environmental Policy, 
54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 164, 165 (2005). 
 63. See Robert M. Hunt, When do More Patents Reduce R&D?, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 87, 90 
(2006) (developing a model of the effect on research and development of changes in patent law); 
Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property 
Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1394 (2009) (―[A]llocative inefficiency in intellectual property law 
potentially imposes a far more significant social cost than it does with respect to tangible property.‖).  
 64. Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 129, 144 (2004); Lichtman, supra note 27, at 616–17. 
 65. See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 33, at 268 (discussing the effect of externalities on 
incentives). Just because externalities affect innovation incentives does not mean that the optimal level 
of incentives necessarily requires internalizing all externalities. Id. 
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potential innovator to face zero net externalities with respect to innovation, 
meaning the potential innovator would be able to capture the full benefit 
from and have to pay the full cost of a particular innovation, such an 
innovator would face socially optimal incentives to innovate. In effect, 
firms that attempt to develop and utilize necessary innovation in-house are 
sometimes trying to produce this effect internally.
66
 The existence of 
externalities, however, will mean that in most cases the private trade-offs 
between the incentives and exclusivity of innovation will diverge.  
There is no reason to expect that the divergence between private and 
social innovation trade-offs will be the same for all private entities or that 
they will remain constant across different levels of patent protection. To 
the contrary, because greater or lesser protection is expected to affect 
positive and negative innovation externalities in different manners, such as 
by creating anticommons or property thicket effects, the relationship 
between private and social trade-offs will vary across entities and across 
different levels of propertization. Thus, the function that identifies a 
private entity‘s net innovation incentives for any given level of patent 
protection will not only be located at a different level than society‘s 
innovation function in Figure 1, but also will display a different structure 
and will likely have its maximum at a different level of protection. 
B. Private Industry Preferences 
From a societal perspective, an increase in patent rights simultaneously 
produces a marginal incentive to innovate due to the increased potential 
value of a patent reward and a marginal disincentive to innovate due to the 
increased exclusionary effects of stronger patent rights held by others. The 
relative size of these marginal changes dictates whether any given change 
in rights is socially beneficial.
67
 
 
 
 66. Historic examples of such efforts include famous laboratories at Bell Labs, DuPont, and 3M. 
See Erin Shinneman, Owning Global Knowledge: The Rise of Open Innovation and the Future of 
Patent Law, 35 BROOK. J. INT‘L L. 935, 940–41 (2010) (discussing the system of closed innovation at 
large corporate research laboratories, including Bell Labs, in the twentieth century); Stuart M. 
Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1, 14 (2008) (noting breakthrough innovation at in-house research laboratories in ―an earlier era‖); 
THOMAS P. HUGHES, AMERICAN GENIUS: A CENTURY OF INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
ENTHUSIASM 1870–1970 7 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing the rise of industrial research laboratories, 
including ones at General Electric, Du Pont, General Motors, and Bell Telephone). It is likely far 
harder to accomplish such a system today due to the greater need to use other firms‘ intellectual 
property. 
 67. Hunt, supra note 46, at 415. 
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The analysis of rights from a private perspective is similar, although 
the basis for the preferences is slightly different. Private individuals will 
perceive a marginal incentive to innovate from an increase in patent rights, 
due to the opportunity for greater profit from stronger rights. Private 
individuals will also perceive a marginal cost from a strengthening of 
patent rights due to a corresponding increase in the cost of patent inputs 
that are owned by other entities and due to rent dissipation caused by 
increased competition between protected technologies or future 
innovation. Private actors will support increasing patent protection to the 
extent they perceive that their marginal opportunity to profit from 
increased rights will exceed the marginal cost of competing patent owners 
obtaining stronger rights.
68
 The magnitude and direction of the marginal 
effects of changes in patent protection on private incentives will vary from 
society‘s for any given change due to externalities.  
Because most innovators do not expect to be one-time players in 
innovation fields, they will be cognizant of the potential negative impact 
of stronger propertization and will seek to maximize the private value of a 
cumulative stream of innovation over time.
69
 This will be particularly true 
if we shift from private individuals to firms and to an industry-wide 
perspective. To an even greater extent than individuals, firm and industry 
preferences will routinely take into account both the benefits and the costs 
of lesser or greater levels of patent protection. It is often competing firms 
within one‘s own industry that most directly experience the negative 
exclusivity costs of increases in the strength of patent rights. 
Consequently, industry preferences for patent rights will seek a level of 
protection that optimizes incentives for the industry.
70
 
Industries, of course, are not monolithic entities, but are made up of a 
collection of firms that each have their own patent preference functions. 
For purposes of introducing the proxy approach, the analysis begins by 
focusing on industries as characterized by their dominant firms, which are 
the entities that will most strongly direct the industry‘s advocacy.71 This 
 
 
 68. See PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 5 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. 
McChesney eds., 2003) (discussing that private market entities will want to increase propertization up 
to the point where the marginal gain of increased rights equals the marginal cost of the increased 
rights). 
 69. This is one context where patent law may diverge from other domains. While most entities 
can expect to end up on both sides of patent rights ownership disputes, in other contexts this is not the 
case. Certain entities will expect to be torts defendants more often than plaintiffs, or environmental 
polluters more often than environmental protectors. This effect is taken into account in the analysis. 
See infra Part III. 
 70. Barnett, supra note 30, at 388. 
 71. Kesan & Gallo, supra note 54, at 1362–63. 
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simplification is relaxed later in the article to achieve a more fine-grained 
examination and more precise signals.
72
  
Just because private industries are expected to have patent preference 
functions that seek optimal innovation incentives for their industry does 
not mean that the shape of the private industry function will reflect the 
shape of the social innovation function. Positive and negative externalities 
from innovating and patenting will cause industry patent preference 
functions to differ from the social preference function, sometimes greatly. 
If, for example, increasing patent protection would allow an industry to 
profit on net at the expense of those outside the industry, such as by 
increasing wealth transfer or dead weight losses, the industry will prefer 
stronger protection, even though such stronger propertization may be 
socially detrimental on net due to society-wide increased exclusivity costs. 
Industry operators, including industry advocacy organizations and 
dominant firms within an industry, will seek to maximize the private value 
of patent protection for the industry, without regard to the effect of such a 
level of protection on society as a whole.
73
 This will lead various 
industries to advocate for patent rights that are either stronger or weaker 
than the socially optimal level, depending on the industry. Figure 2 adds a 
pair of hypothetical private industry preference functions to the original 
society-wide preference function of Figure 1. An industry that can benefit 
from strong patent rights to extract large monopoly profits, even if this 
reduces overall innovation incentives for society, will advocate for 
stronger patent protection than is socially optimal. Industry A in Figure 2 
presents an industry of this type. The private value that Industry A derives 
from any given level of patent protection is denoted by the function IA(p). 
Conversely, an industry that can piggyback on others‘ innovation in order 
to profit, or that faces extreme risks of property thickets, may favor weaker 
patent rights than those that would maximize incentives from a societal 
perspective. Industry B in Figure 2 presents this possibility; its private 
value function is denoted by IB(p).
74
 
 
 
 72. See infra Part III.F.2. Some research indicates that we may want to particularly concentrate 
on smaller firms and start-ups to optimally promote innovation. Golden, supra note 41, at 545–46. 
 73. See LIBECAP, supra note 54, at 4 (―In bargaining over creating or modifying property rights, 
the stands taken by various bargaining parties, including private claimants, . . . will be molded by their 
private expected gains.‖); see FRISCHMANN, supra note 39, at 72–78 (discussing the difference 
between social and private demand preferences). 
 74. The private innovation profiles are graphed to generally lie below the social value patent 
function because an industry generally cannot produce greater innovation than society as a whole. See 
Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 33, at 257, 259 (―There is abundant evidence that the social value 
of innovations far exceeds the private value.‖); Michael J. Meurer & Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent 
Carrots and Sticks: A Model of Nonobviousness, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 547, 549 (2008) (noting 
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FIGURE 2. INDUSTRY PREFERENCES FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION
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Private industry preferences for patent protection will be self-
interested, seeking to maximize the private value of innovation for the 
industry. As a result, private industry advocacy concerning patent law 
generally does not provide a useful signal concerning the optimal level of 
patent protection for society as a whole. That said, private patent law 
advocacy is based on an industry‘s internal information concerning how to 
optimize innovation and intellectual property rights for the industry, 
information that is far superior to anything that public policy makers have 
at their disposal.
75
 Current intellectual property law is based in part on this 
premise, that the private sector has better information in these regards than 
the public. If the government had the same—or better—information as the 
private sector, patent and copyright law would be unnecessary, as the 
government could select the research and innovation activity that would 
most benefit society and then make such innovation available at cost. 
As private industry has the best information concerning the relationship 
between innovation and intellectual property law, it would be highly 
valuable if public policy makers could acquire and leverage this 
information. Any signals that can be accurately drawn from private 
industry activity will have the substantial benefit of great financial and 
 
 
that it ―is realistically nearly always the case‖ that ―the social value of research projects substantially 
exceeds their private value‖). 
 75. Carroll, supra note 63, at 1374. 
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informational resources. The following section explains how proxy 
analysis can be used to take advantage of private industry advocacy as a 
signal to identify socially advantageous levels of patent protection.  
C. Leveraging Innovation Market Dynamics 
Recent debates over patent reform make evident that different 
industries interact with the patent system in widely disparate manners. 
Conflict over proposed patent reform legislation that has been introduced 
in Congress in each of the past six years provides a prominent example. 
The software and information technology industries,
76
 for example, have 
argued vociferously for patent reform in order to reduce the strength of 
patent protection that they see as stifling innovation and technological 
advance in their fields.
77
 The pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, 
on the other hand, have argued just as strenuously that strong patent 
protection is critical to the survival of their industries and to continued 
technological innovation.
78
 One industry‘s paradise of strong patent 
protection is another industry‘s prison of inefficient barriers to innovation. 
Given the analysis above, these stark differences are not surprising. 
Industries vary significantly in their manner and form of innovation, the 
relationship between such innovation and the patent system, and the 
market structure within the industry. All of these factors can have 
significant effects on how an industry interacts with the patent system, and 
therefore on which aspects of the patent system an industry favors or finds 
distasteful.
79
 In economic terms, each of these factors affects the particular 
externalities that an industry faces in relation to patent protection, and 
therefore will affect the shape of the industry‘s private patent preference 
function.
80
 
 
 
 76. Neither software nor information technology are precisely defined industries. Firms in many 
industries develop software. For purposes of this article, the software industry includes those firms 
whose primary line of business involves developing and commercializing software applications. 
Microsoft is an archetypal example. Information technology could be defined broadly to include the 
Internet, telecommunications, computers, software, semiconductors, and other fields, or more 
narrowly. For purposes of this Article, the information technology industry refers to firms who 
primarily provide information services, but do not fall within one of the other industries that are 
separated for analysis here (see Table 1). Internet companies are a good example. 
 77. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 13, at 100–02. 
 78. Id.  
 79. See Kesan & Gallo, supra note 54, at 1351–53 (discussing how the type of technology a 
company produces and company size will affect its patent system preferences). 
 80. See Dietmar Harhoff, R&D Spillovers, Technological Proximity, and Productivity Growth—
Evidence from German Panel Data, 52 SCHMALENBACH BUS. REV. 238 (2000) (finding that positive 
externalities vary by industry). 
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Because industry patent preferences vary, as indicated in Figure 2, the 
relationship between different industries‘ private incentive versus 
exclusivity trade-offs at a given level of patent protection, and the social 
trade-offs at that same level of protection, will also vary. This variation is 
why industries line up on opposite sides of various patent reform debates. 
Industry A in Figure 2, for example, will advocate for a PA-preferred level of 
protection, while Industry B will advocate for a PB-preferred level of 
protection. If a particular patent law change is proposed, each industry will 
evaluate the effect of that change relative to the status quo, and advocate 
for or against the change based on their private preferences.
81
 
Any relationship between private industry advocacy and whether a 
particular patent reform is socially beneficial is entirely accidental from 
the industry‘s point of view. Accidental, however, does not mean random 
or unknowable. Some industries‘ private propertization preference 
functions will be more similar to the social function than others. Figure 3 
adds a third industry to the earlier analysis, Industry C, which happens to 
present a preference profile that is more similar to the social profile than 
either Industry A or Industry B. As a result of Industry C‘s more similar 
profile, Industry C‘s optimal level of patent protection (PC-preferred) will be 
closer to the socially optimal level of protection than either Industry A or 
Industry B. This will mean that, in most cases, Industry C will be more 
likely to advocate for socially preferable levels of patent protection than 
either Industry A or Industry B. This is not because Industry C is any more 
socially altruistic than Industry A or B, but rather it is a side-effect of the 
form of Industry C‘s private innovation preference profile. 
Figure 3 reveals that the quantitative size of the gap between an 
industry‘s innovation profile and the social profile is not relevant to 
whether the industry will tend to advocate for or against socially 
preferable patent rights. Rather, what matters are the form of the patent 
preference function and the position of the maximum of that function. It is 
not the size of the industry, but the form of its preferences. As long as the 
maxima of the private industry and social preference functions lie at 
relatively similar levels of propertization and the form of the functions are 
comparable across various levels of patent protection, then a private 
 
 
 81. See LIBECAP, supra note 54, at 11 (―In contracting over proposed property rights, the 
bargaining stands taken by the various parties depend on how they view their welfare under the new 
arrangement relative to the status quo.‖). 
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FIGURE 3. PRIVATE INDUSTRY PREFERENCES AND INNOVATION
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industry will tend to desire a socially beneficial level of patent rights.
82
 
The question thus becomes whether we can identify the Industry C‘s of the 
world. 
Proxy signal analysis provides a way to do so. Critical to the signal 
methodology, the structure of private industry preference functions are not 
random. Rather, the private preference profiles are the result of industry 
characteristics concerning the relationship between innovation in the 
industry and the patent system. By identifying industry characteristics that 
tend to produce a closer correspondence between the structure of an 
industry‘s preference function and the social function, it is possible to 
leverage private industry advocacy concerning patent protection as a 
valuable proxy signal concerning whether such protection levels are 
actually socially beneficial. As discussed in the following part, identifying 
industry characteristics that produce the desired social correspondence is 
both a feasible undertaking and a more manageable task than prior efforts 
to identify optimal levels of patent protection directly.  
 
 
 82. Stated mathematically, it is not relevant whether I(p) ≈ Ii(p) for any given level of patent 
protection for any given industry, but whether δI/δp ≈ δii/δp in general, and whether the point, Poptimal, 
at which δI/δp = 0 is approximately equal to the point at which δii/δp = 0. 
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III. PRIVATE INDUSTRY PROXY SIGNALS 
This part applies the new proxy signal framework to the problem of 
identifying the optimal level of patent protection for society. The 
discussion will provide a functional road map for how proxy signals can 
work, and analyze such signals for patent law. Due to space constraints, 
the instant examination is not fully comprehensive at this stage, but 
introduces the complete framework and indicates how it applies in various 
currently contentious patent debates, including whether or not the America 
Invents Act and recent Supreme Court decisions are expected to increase 
net incentives to innovate. Following the initial exposition of proxy signal 
analysis is a discussion of how it can be refined to take into account 
variation within industries and to function dynamically, as well as 
clarifications and responses to anticipated questions.  
A. Industry Variation in Innovation 
The manner of innovation in an industry, the relationship between 
innovation in the industry and the intellectual property system, and firm 
and market structure within an industry all vary from industry to industry. 
These differences cause different industries to interact with the patent 
system in widely different manners, and consequently cause different 
industries to have different patent law preferences. 
Patent and copyright law, however, primarily take a one-size-fits-all 
approach to intellectual property protection.
83
 The same patent law 
generally applies whether one patents a better mousetrap, component of a 
cell phone, or new nanobiotechnological process.
84
 The same copyright 
law generally applies to literary works, musical compositions, and artistic 
creations.
85
 Some commentators support unitary intellectual property 
regimes, arguing that there are sufficient benefits to uniform patent and 
copyright law that outweigh the potential costs of differentiating across 
industries.
86
 Other scholars and analysts consider industry variation to be a 
 
 
 83. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293–94 (2012); Burk 
& Lemley, supra note 6 at 1576–77; Clarisa Long, Our Uniform Patent System, 55 FED. LAW. 44, 47–
49 (2008). 
 84. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). There are certain ways in which patent rights do vary by industry, 
most relatively minor. See Carroll, supra note 63, at 1390. 
 85. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).  
 86. E.g., Long, supra note 83, at 49 (―The same might be said of a unitary patent system that 
Winston Churchill famously said about democracy: It‘s the worst form of patent system, except for all 
the others that have been tried.‖); R. Polk Wagner, Of Patents and Path Dependency: A Comment on 
Burk and Lemley, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1341 (2004). Long-standing United States policy and 
extant international treaties governing intellectual property law also indicate a largely unitary regime. 
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problem for intellectual property law, as it indicates that different 
intellectual property laws would optimize incentives to innovate in 
different industries.
87
 Without weighing in on this robust debate, the 
analysis here accepts the unitary approach as a functional given to 
introduce the proxy approach, and subsequently discusses how proxy 
analysis could be applied in a differentiated patent regime. 
Proxy analysis begins with a study of the particular industry 
characteristics that cause industries to encounter innovation and the patent 
system differently. These different characteristics cause industries to vary 
in their patent preferences, both functionally and politically in their 
advocacy. After examining the industry innovation characteristics, the 
analysis evaluates how each characteristic affects the relationship between 
private and social innovation preferences. This understanding is then used 
to evaluate which industries provide the most socially equivalent proxy 
signals. Though some may bristle at a perception of effectively privileging 
certain industry preferences, either because of discomfort with a focus on 
private preferences at all or because of an inferred favoritism for certain 
industries, it is critical to recognize that industries are selected not to 
promote or privilege any industry itself, but to utilize industry preferences 
to reveal private information concerning what is best for innovation for 
public society as a whole. 
B. Industry Innovation Characteristics  
Industry variation in patent preferences derives from a number of 
different innovation characteristics. Evaluating these innovation 
characteristics presents empirical questions on which we possess 
substantial data. The industry characteristics that influence patent 
preferences can be roughly divided into three categories: (1) variation in 
the characteristics of the primary technology in which the industry 
 
 
Hearing on ―Bridging the Tax Gap‖ Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 108th Congress (2004) 
(Statement of Nicholas Godici, Comm‘r for Patents, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) (stating that 
the patent system is ―technology neutral and there shall be no disparate treatment for different 
categories of inventions‖); Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 154. 
 87. E.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 13, at 167 (contending that ―a patent system that is not 
flexible enough to account for . . . industry difference is unlikely to survive‖); Carroll, supra note 63, 
at 1366, 1389, 1406 (stating that ―as a normative matter, intellectual property rights should be tailored 
to reduce uniformity cost‖ and discussing when such tailoring should occur); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., 
Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 
1, 6 (2004) (arguing for certain variation in intellectual property protection so as to ―limit application 
of a uniform system of intellectual property rights to ‗similar‘ innovative products‖). 
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innovates, (2) variation in the characteristics of patenting in the industry, 
and (3) variation in the market structure of the industry. These innovation 
characteristics are analyzed below with respect to nine of the heaviest 
patenting industries in the United States: biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, 
software, semiconductors, medical devices, telecommunications, 
mechanical, financial, and information technology. For ease of 
introduction, the initial analysis in this Article simplifies variation within 
these industries by focusing on the dominant firms within a given industry, 
which will also be the authority within an industry that tends to drive its 
advocacy. In practice, different subgroups within an industry will have 
different innovation characteristics. This additional texture is incorporated 
later in the Article to further refine proxy signal analysis.
88
 The particular 
traits analyzed below are based on an extensive literature search to identify 
pertinent innovation characteristics.
89
 
The following discussion demonstrates how industries can be evaluated 
in order to identify their pertinent innovation characteristics. The analysis 
is based on existing empirical data from a variety of sources for different 
industries, as indicated in the footnotes. As noted above, this discussion is 
not intended to be the final word on innovation characteristics but to 
demonstrate that such analysis is feasible and that the appropriate 
information can be derived from relevant sources or through additional 
work. The goal of the analysis is to eventually select a small collection of 
suitable subindustries whose preferences come closest to mirroring 
society‘s. The analysis of innovation characteristics is summarized at the 
end of this section in Table 1. 
1. Variation in Technology Characteristics 
Due to variation in underlying technologies, the manner of innovation 
varies significantly from industry to industry. Some industries are much 
more research and development intensive than others. The pharmaceutical 
and biotechnology sectors, for example, require costly, time-consuming, 
risky research and development in order to achieve new innovation, such 
as new drugs and new biologics.
90
 Developing a new drug or biologic 
routinely takes a decade or more, costs hundreds of millions of dollars, 
and often requires testing hundreds of alternatives or compounds.
91
 
 
 
 88. See infra Part III.F.1. 
 89. See supra note 88; see also infra notes 90–121. 
 90. Burk & Lemley, supra note 6, at 1581–82, 1676. 
 91. Id.; Geeta Anand, The Most Expensive Drugs—Rx for an Industry: As Biotech Drug Prices 
Surge, U.S. is Hunting for a Solution, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2005, at A1. 
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Semiconductor development similarly takes years and costs billions of 
dollars.
92
 Other industries, including software and information technology 
are less research intensive, allowing for much cheaper innovation that 
generally takes less time, and is lower risk.
93
 New software applications 
can often be produced for under a million dollars.
94
  
Innovation also varies across industry due to technological differences 
in the ease of reverse engineering and the lifecycle of new technological 
development. Some technologies, such as medical devices and 
pharmaceuticals, are relatively easy to reverse engineer, while others, such 
as certain biotechnology processes, are much harder.
95
 Similarly, some 
technological industries, including semiconductors and software, evolve 
very quickly, with technological turnover on the order of several years or 
less.
96
 New innovation in these industries quickly becomes obsolete. Other 
industries, including pharmaceuticals and some mechanical fields, utilize 
technologies with much longer lifecycles.
97
 The technological lifespan of 
innovation in these industries can measure decades, sometimes exceeding 
the twenty-year length of a patent term.
98
 
2. Variation in Patenting Characteristics 
Due in part to differences in technology characteristics, industries also 
vary significantly in how they interact with, and seek to take advantage of, 
the patent system.
99
 The utility and methodology of patenting, for 
example, depends significantly on whether the paradigm form of 
innovation in an industry involves discrete stand-alone innovation, such as 
 
 
 92. Burk & Lemley, supra note 6, at 1582. 
 93. Id. at 1582–83, 1687. 
 94. Id. at 1582. Distinct from an industry‘s research and development intensity is its research and 
development productivity; that is, how much innovation is achieved per research and development 
dollar spent. See generally ROBERT M. HUNT & LEONARD J. NAKAMURA, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF 
U.S. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AFTER 1980 (2010). 
 95. Arman H. Nadershahi & Joseph Reisman, Generic Biotech Products: Provisions in Patent 
and Drug Development Law, BIOPROCESS INT‘L, Oct. 2003, p. 26–31. 
 96. Bronwyn Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical 
Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979–1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101, 102 
(2001); Aaron K. Chatterji & Kira Fabrizio, Professional Users as a Source of Innovation: The 
Role of Physician Innovation in the Medical Device Industry 8 (Mar. 2, 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://www.bus.umich.edu/Academics/Departments/Strategy/pdf/W2008% 
20Chatterji.pdf. 
 97. Burk & Lemley, supra note 6, at 1664. 
 98. Michael Meehan, Increasing Certainty and Harnessing Private Information in the U.S. 
Patent System: A Proposal for Reform, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 13 (2010). 
 99. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 13, at 49–54 (discussing the industry-specific nature of the 
patent system with respect to patent prosecution and the scope of patented subject matter). 
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a new drug or device, or whether most innovation involves cumulative 
advances that evolve dependently from one innovation to the next, as 
occurs in the semiconductor, software, and information technology 
industries.
100
 
Patenting characteristics vary further depending on the relationship 
between the form of innovation and what is actually commercialized. 
Innovation can involve individual, complete products that are 
commercialized (for example, most pharmaceuticals), components of 
products that are commercialized (as in the telecommunications and 
information technology industries), or processes (for example, in much 
financial innovation).
101
 Some industries cannot be cabined in this 
manner—the biotechnology industry, for instance, produces significant 
innovation that falls into all three categories.
102
 
The relationship between industry innovation and patenting is also 
significantly affected by the manner in which a firm is able to protect and 
appropriate returns from innovation. Certain industries, including 
pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, and medical devices depend heavily on 
patent protection to allow them to appropriate returns from innovation.
103
 
These industries have only weak alternatives to patent protection, in part 
because their products are easy to reverse engineer and copy, precluding 
trade secret or other forms of protection. Other industries, such as the 
financial and software fields, rely primarily on methods besides patent 
protection to leverage their intellectual assets.
104
 Such industries are able 
to take significant advantage of lead-time, secrecy, and complementary 
manufacturing and marketing techniques to appropriate value from their 
innovation, in some cases regardless of patent protection.
105
  
Partially related to variation in how firms protect and profit from their 
innovation is variation across industries in incentives to produce 
innovation in the first instance. While innovation in many industries is 
 
 
 100. Burk & Lemley, supra note 6, at 1590; Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and 
Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 41 (2001). 
 101. Burk & Lemley, supra note 6, at 1590; Barnett, supra note 30, at 428. 
 102. Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and 
Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not) 19 (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 7552, 2000). 
 103. Id.; Ted M. Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical 
Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 111, 148–49 (2010). 
 104. Id.; Barnett, supra note 30, at 403. 
 105. Cohen et al., supra note 102, at 24; Josh Lerner, The New New Financial Thing: The Origins 
of Financial Innovations, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 223, 228 (2006); Jonathan Barnett, Private Protection of 
Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1257–69 (2004) (discussing a variety of alternative 
appropriation mechanisms besides intellectual property rights, including various first-mover strategies, 
copy protection mechanisms, and private contract). 
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primarily motivated by the prospect of financial reward, innovation in 
certain industries springs significantly from other motivations as well. 
Individuals may be motivated to innovate for a variety of personal, 
cultural, and social reasons in addition to potential profits.
106
 University 
and government funding and support, for instance through the National 
Science Foundation or National Institutes of Health, also provide non-
intellectual property-based motivation for innovation in the form of 
research funding and rewards.
107
 These sources can form the direct or 
indirect basis of much innovation, for example in parts of the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors.
108
 
3. Variation in Market Structure Characteristics 
Variation in firm and market structure across different industries also 
affects industry preferences for patent protection.
109
 Four of the most 
significant dimensions of variation for these purposes concern whether an 
industry is significantly concentrated or more diffuse; whether an industry 
is generally made up of large firms, small firms, or individuals; whether an 
industry is a net consumer or net producer of innovation; and what 
patterns of intellectual property enforcement are in a given industry. 
The pharmaceutical industry tends to be dominated by large firms that 
own their own patents on internally produced innovation.
110
 Intellectual 
property enforcement in the industry is roughly average.
111
 The 
biotechnology industry is somewhat similar, although there is greater 
diversity in innovation firm size.
112
 Both industries are net producers of 
innovation; they require relatively limited or self-controlled intellectual 
property inputs, and their commercialization products are primarily 
intellectual property based. The medical device industry firm size lies at 
the other end of the spectrum, being made up mostly of small firms and 
 
 
 106. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 29, 36–40, 46–47 (2011); BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 13, at 44. 
 107. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 106, at 48. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Competition for Innovation 2–9, 26 (Oct. 1, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2008953 
(noting and discussing how innovation is ―highly sensitive to market structure‖). 
 110. Alfonso Gambardella, Competitive advantages from in-house scientific research: The US 
pharmaceutical industry in the 1980s, 21 RES. POL‘Y 391 (1992). 
 111. John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 472 (2004). 
 112. Burk & Lemley, supra note 6, at 1591; David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent 
Metrics: The Mismeasurement of Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1677, 
1687 (2007). 
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individuals.
113
 Innovations in medical devices are often used by 
individuals and firms who developed the inventions, but are also licensed 
to others.
114
 The medical device industry has one of the highest rates of 
patent enforcement litigation.
115
 
The semiconductor industry is dominated by a relatively small number 
of large firms, each of which have substantial patent portfolios that the 
firms routinely cross-license among each other.
116
 Consequently, 
enforcement of patent rights within the industry is limited.
117
 The 
computer software industry, on the other hand, is an extremely diversified 
industry made up of firms of all different sizes.
118
 Many of the larger firms 
are net consumers of innovation, relying in significant manner on 
innovation achieved by others.
119
 Enforcement of patent rights in the 
industry tends to be relatively strong.
120
 The telecommunications industry 
also varies greatly in firm size and the dominant firms similarly rely 
heavily on licensing patent rights from original equipment manufacturers 
to produce products for consumers.
121
 
The financial industry is heavily diversified in firm size. Most 
innovation takes place within industry firms, although it appears that 
smaller firms may generally be more innovative than larger ones.
122
 Patent 
enforcement is low.
123
 The mechanical industry may be the largest in 
terms of numbers of firms, and most diverse in firm size, of any of the 
patenting industries discussed. Mechanical industries tend to be net 
producers of innovation, usually requiring relatively limited intellectual 
property inputs. Patent owning firms are more likely to litigate than 
average.
124
 
Table 1 details the analysis of innovation characteristics by industry.
125
  
 
 
 113. Burk & Lemley, supra note 6, at 1591. 
 114. Chatterji & Fabrizio, supra note 96, at 8. 
 115. Allison, supra note 111, at 472. 
 116. Burk & Lemley, supra note 6, at 1628. 
 117. Allison, supra note 111, at 468. 
 118. See DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, SOFTWARE PUBLISHERS, 
CAREER GUIDE TO INDUSTRIES, 2010–2011 EDITION, available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs051 
.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2010). 
 119. Burk & Lemley, supra note 6, at 1592. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Michael Gallaher & Jeffrey Petrusa, Innovation in the U.S. Service Sector, 31 J. TECH. 
TRANSFER 611, 616 (2006). 
 122. Lerner, supra note 105, at 224. 
 123. Barnett, supra note 30, at 427. 
 124. Allison, supra note 111, at 473. 
 125. The information in the cells in Table 1 is derived from the sources listed in notes 86–120. 
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C. Industry Characteristics as Proxy Signals for Social Preferences 
Industry heterogeneity with respect to the patent system provides a 
previously untapped source for collecting information concerning socially 
beneficial levels of patent protection. Many of the traits that cause 
industries to vary from one another in their patent preferences reveal 
information not just about the pertinent technology or market, but also 
about whether the particular industry‘s incentive versus exclusivity trade-
offs can be expected to mirror societal trade-offs. Depending on the 
particular characteristics of a given industry, it will tend to advocate for 
excessively weak patent rights from a social perspective, excessively 
strong patent rights, or, in certain instances, just about the right level of 
patent protection. 
It is possible to work through the technological, patenting, and market 
characteristics delineated above to identify those characteristics that tend 
to lead an industry to prefer socially desirable levels of patent protection. 
This task involves identifying industry traits that are inclined to produce 
smaller, as opposed to larger, variation between private versus social 
innovation preferences. This search will ascertain industries that face 
incentive versus exclusivity trade-offs that mirror society‘s as closely as 
possible. For example, as discussed earlier, society aspires to balance the 
production and consumption interests in innovation in order to optimize 
incentives. An industry that naturally balances these interests due to its 
particular innovation characteristics will tend to mirror society‘s 
preferences on this characteristic. More broadly, an industry that faces the 
same trade-offs as society across the range of innovation characteristics 
will have a private preference function that has a similar shape to the 
social innovation function. Such an industry will tend, for purely self-
interested reasons, to prefer and advocate for socially beneficial levels of 
patent protection from a societal perspective. 
An alternate way to understand this analysis is as an effort to identify 
which industry characteristics are either likely to produce few externalities 
with respect to patent protection, or, to the extent there are significant 
externalities, to identify which characteristics are likely to produce 
relatively constant externalities across various levels of patent protection. 
In either case, the identified industry characteristics will produce private 
preference profiles with a similar form to the social profile. Though each 
industry is motivated to maximize its private value of innovation, selecting 
the proper innovation characteristics will mean these private preferences 
align with social preferences. 
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Engaging in this analysis produces a powerful result. Even though we 
may not be able to directly identify the form or maximum of the social 
patent protection function, we may instead identify a proxy that mirrors 
this function‘s form. Because the proxy‘s maximum will be located near 
the same level of propertization as the social function‘s maximum, 
understanding such a proxy‘s preferences will provide valuable 
information concerning how to optimize the relationship between patent 
law and innovation.  
D. Identifying Optimal Innovation Characteristics 
The following analysis disaggregates the industry innovation 
characteristics identified above to analyze the effect of each characteristic 
on patent preferences individually. That is, it explores the impact of 
variation in a given innovation characteristic on the correspondence 
between private and social innovation trade-offs, assuming all other 
characteristics are kept constant.  
Production vs. Consumption of Innovation. One of the most significant 
factors affecting industry positions on patent protection is whether an 
industry is a net consumer or net producer of innovation. The 
pharmaceutical industry, for example, is largely a net producer of 
innovation products, developing new chemical drugs that require relatively 
few patent protected inputs.
126
 Industries that are net producers of 
innovation will feel limited exclusivity costs of patent protection but 
recognize great incentive benefits from patent rights, and thus will tend to 
favor strong propertization. As propertization increases for these 
industries, the marginal private benefit of increased incentives will 
regularly outweigh the marginal private cost of greater exclusivity. 
The software industry presents the opposite situation as a net consumer 
of innovation. Large software firms, such as Microsoft, are heavy 
consumers of innovation, requiring many inputs from independent smaller 
entities and individuals in order to develop their products.
127
 Even though 
the software industry produces some innovation as a whole, the dominant 
firms in the industry, and thus the ones that will drive industry advocacy, 
tend to be net consumers. Net consumers of innovation face large 
exclusivity costs, but derive relatively limited incentives from increased 
 
 
 126. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 10 (Oct. 2003), available at http://ftc.gov/os/2003/ 
10/innovationrpt.pdf. 
 127. Kesan & Gallo, supra note 54, at 1351–53. 
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patent protection. They will tend to favor relatively weaker patent 
propertization, preferring to leverage the substantial positive externalities 
that can be reaped by taking advantage of innovation spillovers without 
paying the innovation‘s full development costs.128 
Some industries are more mixed. The semiconductor field, as an 
example, is made up of firms that both rely on others‘ technology and 
produce their own innovation. A new semiconductor chip introduces 
innovation, but also depends on technology covered by thousands of other 
patents, thus significantly consuming innovation as well.
129
 Similarly, 
telecommunications companies profit from innovation, but also depend 
heavily on innovation by original equipment manufacturers to incorporate 
into their products. Industries that are balanced in their consumption and 
production of innovation are forced to consider both the beneficial 
incentives and exclusivity costs of patent rights, and therefore tend to face 
more similar innovation trade-offs to society as a whole.
130
 
Stand-alone vs. Cumulative Innovation. Another significant factor 
affecting patent preferences concerns whether technological advance in an 
industry generally involves stand-alone or cumulative innovation. 
Information technology innovation, for example, is highly cumulative, 
each new innovation building upon and incorporating many previous 
advances. Pharmaceuticals, on the other hand, are often stand-alone 
patented products. Industries that involve stand-alone innovation are 
expected to prefer stronger levels of patent protection because they will 
tend to require relatively limited intellectual property inputs and 
consequently face few exclusivity costs. Industries with cumulative 
innovation, on the other hand, must necessarily take into account the cost 
of input innovation, and consequently will tend to balance the incentive 
value of propertization against its exclusivity cost. Industries with 
 
 
 128. Net consumer industries generally will not desire zero protection because their preference for 
limited propertization will be moderated by a desire for enough incentives for innovation producers to 
continue to innovate. A net-consumer with a long-term perspective could recognize the same trade-
offs as society, but would face the same information limitation problems as public entities in trying to 
identify the appropriate level of propertization. In addition, a variety of behavioral and functional 
limitations generally preclude firms and industries from taking long-term perspectives in the market. 
Nadelle Grossman, Turning a Short-Term Fling into a Long-Term Commitment: Board Duties in A 
New Era, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 905 (2010) (discussing how corporate boards and firm 
executives often face biases towards short-term goals). 
 129. ROBERT M. HUNT, THE VALUE OF R&D IN THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY ch. 3 
(1996); Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to do About Patent Holdup of Standards (And One Not To), 48 
B.C. L. REV. 149, 151 (2007). 
 130. See Barnett, supra note 30, at 390 (discussing how firms that both produce and use 
intellectual property goods will tend to prefer an intermediate level of intellectual property protection). 
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cumulative innovation face fewer innovation externalities, and therefore 
will more closely reflect the innovation trade-offs that society faces. 
Product, Component, and Process Protection. For comparable reasons, 
similar effects should be seen for industries that use patents to protect 
commercializable products (who often can ignore much of the exclusivity 
cost of patent protection) versus those who protect components (who are 
forced to take exclusivity costs into account to a greater extent). The 
former are anticipated to prefer stronger patent protection; the latter will 
desire weaker rights. Most medical device and pharmaceutical patents 
protect products, while information technology and telecommunications 
patents often cover components. Industries that primarily patent processes 
present a mixed bag. To the extent companies can execute a process in 
secret in order to commercialize a product, such companies may favor 
excessive patent propertization, as they face few exclusivity costs from 
intellectual property protection.
131
 On the other hand, precisely because 
process innovation industries may be able to secure profits while 
maintaining innovative processes in secret may mean that such industries 
are not very concerned with the level of protection one way or the other.
132
 
This situation thus raises issues of appropriability. 
Alternative Means of Appropriability. How an industry appropriates 
value from innovation will have significant effects on the relationship 
between private and social trade-offs. Industries that are able to rely 
predominantly on alternate appropriability mechanisms, besides patent 
rights, to profit from their innovation receive few benefit incentives from 
patent protection. Consequently, such industries may not face socially 
equivalent trade-offs. This is not to claim that such industries definitively 
do not face socially equivalent trade-offs, only that we cannot tell. It is 
possible that an industry presented with few benefits from patent 
protection also happens to face correspondingly limited exclusivity costs, 
producing a socially equivalent trade-off balance on net.
133
 Rather than 
needing to definitively analyze this complex issue, proxy signal analysis 
 
 
 131. To the extent a process to produce a commercialized product can be conducted in secret, 
there is both a lower likelihood that anyone would bother to acquire a patent on the process, and a 
greater likelihood that competing firms could secretly infringe the process. See Sichelman & Graham, 
supra note 103, at 161–62 (finding that secrecy is viewed as a more adequate form of protection for 
process versus product innovation based on a survey of American entrepreneurial companies). 
 132. Michael A. Carrier, Two Puzzles Resolved: Of the Schumpter-Arrow Stalemate and 
Pharmaceutical Innovation Markets, 93 IOWA L. REV. 393, 405 (2008) (noting secrecy is often more 
effective for protecting process inventions). 
 133. This relationship likely could be investigated by comparing patenting and litigation 
propensity across different industries, though the use of defensive and strategic patenting would make 
it hard to derive concrete results. 
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instead can focus on identifying industries where we have the greatest 
reason to believe that they do face socially equivalent trade-offs. It is not 
necessary to reach a conclusion about where other industries lie in order to 
select those that appear to mirror society. 
Alternative Incentives to Innovate. The extent of alternative incentives 
to innovate, beyond patent rights, will affect industry preferences in a 
somewhat similar fashion. Industries with substantial alternative 
incentives recognize few benefits from patent protection, potentially 
upsetting their balance between incentives and exclusivity. Again, these 
industries may happen to also have limited exclusivity costs, but we do not 
know whether this balances out. Instead, we can select industries with 
characteristics that more clearly indicate societal correspondence. 
Technology Characteristics. Technological research and development 
characteristics have substantial effects on intellectual property preferences. 
Industries with rapid technology lifecycles, and with cheap and short 
innovation characteristics, will tend to have comparatively fewer 
innovation incentives available from the patent system. Any industry with 
a technology lifecycle of three years of less, for example, will have only 
limited opportunity to benefit from patent protection, as the average patent 
pendency is now about three years long.
134
 The software and information 
technology industries both appear to fall into this category.
135
 Where 
innovation lifecycles are long and routinely outlast patent terms, on the 
other hand, innovation may produce significant externalities, and 
industries in these fields therefore may not possess private preferences that 
regularly mirror social innovation trade-offs either. Biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals appear to fall into this camp.
136
 
Market Concentration. Market structure within an industry can have a 
significant effect on patent propertization preferences. Highly diverse 
industries, with many firms of various sizes, may tend to prefer non-
optimal levels of patent protection. This will occur because as firm 
 
 
 134. Warren K. Mabey, Jr., Deconstructing the Patent Application Backlog . . . A Story of 
Prolonged Pendency, PCT Pandemonium & Patent Pending Pirates, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC‘Y 208 (2010). Certain industries, such as pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, take much longer. 
Id. Industries with technology lifecycles under three years can still receive some benefit through 
patenting, such as by acquiring defensive rights, negotiation power, or as a signal to secure investment 
and financing. Id. 
 135. Chris J. Katopis, Perfect Happiness?: Game Theory as a Tool for Enhancing Patent Quality, 
10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 360 (2008). 
 136. Similar to the discussion above, it is possible in that industries with particularly short or 
lengthy technology lifecycles also face fewer exclusivity costs or negative externalities, respectively, 
such that their net preferences could reflect society‘s desired trade-offs, but this is difficult to know 
and not necessary to resolve for the analysis.  
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numerousity and diversity increase, the transaction costs of patent rights 
will increase, introducing significant externalities with respect to 
innovation in the industry.
137
 A study of the semiconductor industry, for 
example, found that semiconductor firms patent more aggressively, but do 
not engage in any greater research and development, when rights are more 
highly fragmented.
138
 
An industry in which one or a couple firms can use patent protection to 
acquire a monopoly, on the other hand, may permit such firms to impose 
substantial exclusivity costs on others, such that they may not reflect 
socially desired preferences either.
139
 Industries with some concentration, 
but not so much as to tend towards monopolistic pricing power, may be 
more likely to reflect socially desired incentive versus exclusivity trade-
offs.
140
 This is not to state that industries with moderate concentration will 
always provide the greatest innovation environment (a difficult question 
famously pitting Joseph Schumpeter‘s arguments for concentration against 
Kenneth Arrow‘s arguments for competition),141 only that such industries 
are more likely to produce the socially equivalent trade-offs that are useful 
from a proxy signaling perspective.  
Innovator Firm Size. Some research indicates that patents might be 
more important to small firms and individual innovators, who cannot 
easily take advantage of alternative appropriability mechanisms provided 
by reputational goodwill, tacit knowledge, production efficiencies, and 
other factors, or for whom patents may be more necessary to secure 
investment funding.
142
 Industries with heavy representation from small 
 
 
 137. Barnett, supra note 30, at 411–13, 423 (noting that where coordination among firms is 
expensive, transaction costs are greater and tend to inhibit socially optimal propertization outcomes).  
 138. Ziedonis, supra note 51, at 817. 
 139. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for 
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 619–22 (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. 
Research 1962) (discussing problematic effects of monopolies on the dissemination of innovation). An 
industry which presents a natural monopoly may not significantly care about intellectual property 
rights, as it can secure supracompetitive profits regardless of intellectual property law. 
 140. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 109, at 6–7 (explaining that current understanding is that 
innovation is often highest in moderately concentrated markets, and lower in more highly monopolized 
or concentrated markets); Philippe Aghion et al., Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U 
Relationship, 120 Q.J. ECON. 701 (2005) (same); Arrow, supra note 139 (discussing how 
concentrated industries will face fewer transaction costs from propertization and will tend to progress 
towards socially optimal propertization outcomes). Other authors have produced evidence that 
oligopolistic markets, rather than either monopoly or perfect competition, may produce the greatest 
incentives for innovation. BAUMOL, supra note 50, at 30–42; SWANN, supra note 50, at 218–20. 
 141. See Carrier, supra note 132, at 403–04 (discussing the Schumpeter-Arrow debate over the 
relationship between industry concentration versus competition and innovation). 
 142. Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of 
the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255 (2009); Barnett, supra note 105, at 
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firms and individuals are therefore likely to recognize most of the 
incentive benefits, as well as the exclusivity costs, of patent protection. 
Industries dominated by large firms on the other hand, due to their ability 
to rely on various private appropriability mechanisms to establish barriers 
to entry and profit from their intellectual assets, may not face the full 
incentive benefits of patent propertization, and therefore are less likely to 
face socially optimal trade-offs.
143
 
Patent Enforcement. Finally, patterns of patent enforcement within an 
industry will affect intellectual property preferences. Industries with high 
levels of enforcement will tend to face significant transaction costs and 
externalities due to patent rights. Externalities arise because a firm 
considering whether to bring an infringement lawsuit does not factor the 
defendant‘s or society‘s litigation costs into their litigation decision 
analysis. High enforcement cost industries may therefore face excessive 
exclusivity costs when compared to society‘s propertization trade-offs. At 
the other end of the spectrum, industries where there is no realistic threat 
of patent enforcement also will not mirror society‘s trade-offs because 
they are effectively exempt from the exclusivity costs of patenting. The 
most promising industries, in terms of their penchant for paralleling social 
trade-offs, will be industries where there is a real threat of intellectual 
property enforcement if others‘ rights are breached (producing rights 
compliance, and the ability to profit thereby), but such enforcement is 
rarely actually applied (minimizing the transaction costs of enforcement). 
This circumstance would arise in industries with a high degree of industry 
conformity in respecting the intellectual property rights of others.
144
 Firms 
in such industries will have the opportunity to benefit from their own 
innovation, but also face the access costs of having to respect intellectual 
property rights of others, producing the equivalent social trade-offs that 
proxy signal analysis seeks. 
 
 
1254–55, 1283; Long, supra note 25, at 642–43; Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in 
the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961 (2005); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 109, at 7 
(explaining why small firms may be more likely to produce more radical innovation). 
 143. HOVENKAMP, supra note 109, at 7; Barnett, supra note 105, at 1254–55. 
 144. See Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in 
Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986) (providing a field study of how social norms can 
supersede formal legal entitlements in dispute resolution processes in the real property context). 
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E. Innovation Industries with Optimal Signals 
The relationship between industry characteristics and the likelihood 
that such characteristics will cause an industry to face the same incentive 
versus exclusivity trade-offs as society can now be mapped. Table 2 codes 
the industry characteristic data of Table 1 based on whether a given 
characteristic is anticipated to tend to cause private industry preferences to 
parallel social preferences. Where a characteristic is expected to produce 
trade-offs that excessively favor the incentive benefits of patenting, 
producing propertization preferences that are stronger than socially 
optimal, a ―+‖ sign is used; where a characteristic is expected to create 
trade-offs biased towards excessive exclusivity costs, producing 
propertization preferences that are weaker than socially optimal, a ―-‖ sign 
is used. Where an industry characteristic is expected to tend to produce 
socially equivalent trade-offs, keeping all other characteristics constant, 
that record is coded with an ―=‖ sign.  
These results provide a first order analysis of where industries stand in 
relation to socially optimal trade-offs and patent law. Even in this 
introductory form, the analysis reveals valuable and previously 
unrecognized information concerning the interaction between patent law 
and innovation. 
Several results jump out from Table 2. First, the results explain why the 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries on the one hand, and the 
software, financial, and information technology industries on the other, 
have been at loggerheads over patent reform.
145
 The pharmaceutical 
industry results are dominated by characteristics that tend towards a desire 
for overly strong propertization, with few elements that indicate socially 
equivalent or weak propertization incentives. The biotechnology industry 
possesses more characteristics than pharmaceuticals that direct towards 
equivalent trade-offs, but the results are still dominated by strong 
propertization characteristics. Not surprisingly, the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industries have aligned to push for stronger patent rights on 
every major patent reform bill and every major patent case before the 
Supreme Court in recent history.
146
  
 
 
 145. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 13, at 4, 100–02. 
 146. Id. at 100–02; INNOVATION ALLIANCE, LETTER: INDUSTRIES FROM U.S. STATES 
EXPRESS CONCERN OVER PATENT LEGISLATION, available at http://innovationalliance.net/news-and-
resources/letter-industries-us-states-express-concern-over-patent-legislation. 
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The information technology, financial services, and software industries, 
conversely, are each dominated by industry characteristics that tend to 
produce a desire for overly weak propertization. Each of these industry 
profiles does display several characteristics that tend towards socially 
equivalent trade-offs, but each industry has no or only one characteristic 
that indicates strong rights, likely leading to a bias for propertization that 
is weaker than is socially warranted. Not surprisingly, these three 
industries have aligned to uniformly argue for weaker patent rights on 
every recent patent reform bill and Supreme Court patent case.
147
 
Although the results for the five industries discussed so far should not be 
surprising to those who follow patent debates, they lend credence to the 
proxy signal methodology by indicating that the relevant industry 
characteristics can be both identified and accurately evaluated.
148
 
The characteristics of the mechanical industry are highly fractured, 
presenting some elements that indicate a preference for weak rights, some 
a preference for strong rights, and some a preference for more optimal 
patenting trade-offs. These results are likely a consequence of both the 
actual innovation characteristics in the industry and the fact that 
mechanical innovation varies widely across many types of firms and 
innovation, rendering the industry particularly hard to uniformly 
characterize. Simply because an industry has a preference for weak rights 
under one characteristic and strong rights under another does not mean 
that these preferences cancel out. Not only may one preference be stronger 
than another (the tendency towards greater exclusivity on one 
characteristic may outweigh the tendency towards greater incentives on 
another), but a given type of preference may moderate the effects of others 
because the characteristics can interact. An industry with strong alternative 
appropriability means, for example, may not need to rely on patents at all, 
and therefore this characteristic can swamp the fact that the industry also 
produces stand-alone product innovation, which would otherwise indicate 
a tendency for strong rights. Analyzing the industry characteristic data 
requires taking into account these contextual relationships. Because it is 
unclear how these preferences balance out for the mechanical industry, 
this industry is not a good candidate to provide proxy signals. 
 
 
 147. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 13, at 100–02. 
 148. Lending further credence, other studies have found that the ―patent premium,‖ i.e. the 
incremental value of an invention that is realized by patenting it, tends to be greatest for 
biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and medical device companies. Ashish Arora et al., R&D and the 
Patent Premium, 26 INT‘L J. INDUS.ORG. 1153 (2008). 
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The remaining three industries, semiconductors, medical devices, and 
telecommunications, each appear to offer more socially comparable trade-
offs, and therefore may offer useful proxy signals for patent law. Each of 
these three industries has more innovation characteristics that indicate 
socially equivalent trade-offs than characteristics that produce either an 
exclusivity or incentives bias. Further, for each of these industries, the 
characteristics that do not indicate equivalent trade-offs are somewhat split 
between biases towards excessive incentives and excessive exclusivity. 
Though these biases cannot simply be assumed to balance out, the 
existence of a mix produces a possibility for this prospect. 
To explore the possible beneficial signaling propensities of these 
industries, it is necessary to analyze those characteristics which do not 
indicate a close correspondence between private and social trade-offs to 
determine whether they indicate a clear net bias one way or the other. The 
semiconductor industry stands out from the other two in providing strong 
appropriability alternatives to patent protection. As noted above, this 
characteristic can swamp others, and appears to do so here with respect to 
industry characteristics that would otherwise indicate a preference for 
stronger than optimal patent rights. Consistent with this analysis, the 
semiconductor industry has generally advocated for weaker patent rights 
in both legislation and before the Supreme Court in recent patent law 
disputes.
149
 
The medical device and telecommunications industries do not present 
clearly biasing characteristics, and, though not perfect indicators, appear to 
represent the closest parallel trade-offs to society under the analysis thus 
far. Each industry possesses a wealth of characteristics that indicate trade-
offs which mirror society‘s, and each displays a roughly even split among 
its remaining characteristics, without any factors that are clearly strongly 
biasing one way or the other. Notably, the advocacy positions of these two 
industries have been more mixed over time than any of the other 
innovation industries discussed. Medical device industry advocacy has 
varied, sometimes advocating for stronger, sometimes for weaker, patent 
rights, in reference to Supreme Court patent cases and patent reform 
efforts of the past five years.
150
 The telecommunication industry‘s 
 
 
 149. E.g., Brief for Intel Corp., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5, KSR Int’l v. 
Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-1350); Brief for the Business Software Alliance as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4, eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130). 
 150. Compare Brief for Avery Dennison Corporation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Re Seagate Tech. LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (2007) (No. 06-M830) (brief supporting the petitioner in their 
advocacy for weaker patent rights joined by a medical devices company), with Brief for General 
Electric et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, KSR Int’l v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 
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advocacy presents a slightly different pattern. After a period of 
consistently advocating for weaker patent protection in patent reform and 
Supreme Court cases through the earlier part of the 2000s, the industry‘s 
pattern of advocacy became more mixed starting in 2006.
151
 This 
chronology is consistent with an industry that perceived a regime of 
excessive patent protection prior to 2007 rationally shifting its advocacy in 
response to Supreme Court patent decisions that tended to weaken the 
strength of patent rights around this time,
152
 so as to produce a level of 
patent rights that now more closely aligns with the industry‘s desired level 
of propertization. That the data on advocacy appears to fit the proxy signal 
methodology predictions lends credence to both the proxy signal 
framework and the viability of engaging in such analysis. 
Based on this preliminary examination, proxy signal analysis indicates 
that the telecommunications and medical device industries‘ positions on 
patent reform should be considered seriously, perhaps more seriously than 
other industries, as a potential gauge for a socially preferable level of 
patent protection. These initial results can be applied to current patent law 
debates to provide a flavor of how proxy analysis can work.  
Congress enacted the America Invents Act
153
 in the fall of 2011 after 
six years of hotly contested legislative patent reform efforts. Among other 
details, the Act shifts the United States to a first-inventor-to-file (as 
opposed to first-to-invent) patent system and provides new means to 
contest patent validity.
154
 Although watered down from previous patent 
reform efforts, the America Invents Act still represents the most 
significant statutory changes to patent law in over fifty years. Proxy signal 
analysis can be used to indicate whether the America Invents Act will 
likely promote net incentives to innovate across innovation industries by 
examining the medical device and telecommunications industries‘ 
 
 
(2007) (No. 04-1350) (brief supporting the respondent in their advocacy for stronger patent rights 
joined by a medical devices company). 
 151. Compare Brief for EchoStar Communications Corporation, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, In Re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (2007) (No. 06-M830) (telecommunications 
companies supporting petitioner in advocating for weaker patent rights), and Brief for Computer & 
Communications Industry Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, In re Bilski, 129 S. 
Ct. 2735 (2009) (No. 08-964) (same), with Brief for Teles AG as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither 
Party, In re Bilski, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009) (No. 08-964) (brief of telecommunications company 
advocating for a ―robust patent system‖ that rewards technological innovation with strong patent 
protection). 
 152. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (reducing the 
circumstances in which injunctions are appropriate for patent infringement); KSR Int‘l Co. v. Teleflex, 
Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (making it harder to satisfy the nonobviousness standard to get a patent). 
 153. H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 154. Id. 
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positions on the Act. Both the leading medical device trade organization 
and a number of prominent telecommunications companies supported 
passage of the final version of Act,
155
 and it does not appear that any major 
telecommunications or medical device firms or trade organizations 
opposed it. Proxy signal analysis thus indicates that the America Invents 
Act will likely be beneficial to net incentives to innovate for society. 
Proxy signals indicate that the Supreme Court may have gotten its 
decision wrong in one of the most important patent cases of 2011. In 
Microsoft v. i4i Limited Partnership, the Court rejected a challenge to 
Federal Circuit precedent holding that the presumption of validity afforded 
an issued patent can only be overcome by clear and convincing 
evidence.
156
 Microsoft sought to lower this standard to a preponderance of 
the evidence, weakening patent protection in certain circumstances.
157
 A 
number of large telecommunications companies supported Microsoft‘s 
position,
158
 and none appeared to oppose it, indicating that lowering the 
standard for invalidating an issued patent would have increased industry 
incentives to innovate on the whole. 
The most significant patent case of the Supreme Court‘s 2011–2012 
term was Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, 
concerning patent claims that covered observing correlations between 
certain blood test results and patient health so that a doctor would know 
the proper drug dosage to give a patient.
159
 The Court held that the claims 
were ineligible subject matter, a result that may have significant 
implications for the breadth of what types of innovation are patentable, 
particularly concerning innovation in medical diagnoses.
160
 Proxy analysis 
provides a limited signal indicating that the Supreme Court‘s decision in 
Mayo v. Prometheus will promote net incentives to innovate overall, based 
on the lone amicus brief filed by a telecommunications company in the 
 
 
 155. OFFICE OF THE MAJORITY WHIP, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, LIST OF SUPPORTERS OF 
H.R. 1249 (2011), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/issues/Patent%20Reform%20PDFS/HR% 
201249%20Support.pdf. 
 156. Microsoft v. i4i Ltd. P‘ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). 
 157. Id. at 2244–45. 
 158. See Brief of Google Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. 
2238 (including Verizon Communications Inc., L-3 Communications Corp., Consumer Electronics 
Association, and Comcast Corp. as amici curiae); Brief of Amici Curiae Computer and 
Communications Industry Association in Support of Petitioner, Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. 2238. No 
medical device industry associations or firms appear to have supported either side in Microsoft v. i4i.  
 159. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 160. Following the Supreme Court‘s decision in Mayo v. Prometheus, the Court remanded another 
high-profile patent case, Association for Molecular Biology v. Myriad, to the Federal Circuit for 
reconsideration of the validity of Myriad‘s patents on genes linked to breast and ovarian cancer. 132 S. 
Ct. 1794 (2012). 
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case.
161
 Although a number of entities in the medical field filed amicus 
briefs, most were pharmaceutical or biotechnology companies, not medical 
device companies, and therefore do not provide additional useful 
signaling. 
This examination reveals how proxy signals can be used to leverage 
previously untapped but highly valuable information from private industry 
concerning the appropriate propertization trade-off between incentives and 
exclusivity. In essence, this method permits us to parse a notoriously 
difficult challenge: separating, to some extent, the portion of an industry‘s 
preferences that arise from a desire for rent-seeking (via wealth transfer 
from others) from preferences that arise from a desire for a patent system 
that will actually incentivize greater innovation and increase social 
welfare. As discussed below, the proxy signal technique can be enhanced 
in several regards to provide more accurate and more precise signals. 
F. Refining Proxy Signal Analysis 
Building on the proxy signal framework described above, the following 
sections flesh out a number of details and respond to likely questions 
about this new approach. These sections detail how proxy analysis can 
function dynamically to respond to technology and industry evolution, 
how to take into account variation in innovation characteristics within 
industries, the potential to differentiate patent law across different 
industries, proxy signal measurement and selection challenges, 
extraterritorial effects, and other factors. 
1. Dynamic Proxy Signals 
The initial explication of proxy signals above treats the pertinent 
industry innovation characteristics as static. Though innovation 
characteristics will tend to be relatively stable in the short-term, they are 
not static. As technology and industries evolve, their innovation, patenting, 
and market characteristics will evolve as well. Technological evolution, 
for example, may significantly lower research and development costs, lead 
to greater or lesser industry concentration, or affect the difficulty of 
reverse engineering.
162
 All of these changes can lead particular industry 
 
 
 161. See Brief of Verizon Communications Inc. and Hewlett-Packard Co. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners, Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. 1289. 
 162. Consider, as examples, the development of various mass-production techniques in certain 
areas of biotechnology that substantially reduced development costs or the effect of the rise of the 
Internet on the cost of copying and disseminating copyright infringing works. See Burk & Lemley, 
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characteristics to change over time, altering industry patent preferences 
and leading industries to become more or less socially beneficial in their 
patent advocacy. Semiconductor technology, for example, evolved from 
an easy to reverse engineer technology in the 1970s to a technology that 
was nearly impossible to copy by the late 1980s, significantly changing 
the availability of alternative appropriability mechanisms.
163
 As the result 
of this technological change, the innovation characteristics of the 
semiconductor industry changed, and, as would be predicted by proxy 
analysis, semiconductor industry advocacy evolved as well.
164
 Properly 
taking industry signals into account requires continued attention and 
response to changing industry characteristics.
165
 Proxy analysis is not 
static, but can operate dynamically to take into account revised industry 
characteristics as industries evolve. 
Industry structure in innovation industries can also be affected by the 
particular patent regime in place.
166
 This would be a problem for proxy 
analysis if existing industry structure were used as an independent signal 
of optimal rights, but this is not the case. The identification of optimal 
proxy industry characteristics is not based on existing industry structure 
but on which types of characteristics will produce the desired trade-off 
between incentives and exclusivity. Once optimal types of characteristics 
are identified, it is then possible to select industries that currently have the 
desired characteristics. Industries whose structure is strongly dependent on 
the patent regime are likely precisely those industries whose structure is 
most likely to change in response to changes in patent law, and thus merit 
particular attention when considering dynamic effects. 
A related concern may be that, once particular industries are selected as 
offering the best proxy signals available, these industries may lock-in to 
certain legal rules and methods of innovation that are actually detrimental 
for innovation overall. If an industry were to do this, however, its 
innovation characteristics would migrate away from the socially preferred 
 
 
supra note 6, at 1583 (discussing mass-production techniques in biotechnology); Ned Snow, 
Copytraps, 84 IND. L.J. 285, 300 (2009) (discussing the ease of copying copyrighted information on 
the Internet). 
 163. Ziedonis, supra note 51, at 808; HUNT, supra note 129, at ch. 4. 
 164. Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 
111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1604 (2002). 
 165. Properly responding to industry signals would also require various mechanisms to provide 
for relatively efficient adaptation of law, either through judicial or legislative means, in response to 
changing industry signals. The practicalities of such political implementation are beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
 166. Wu, supra note 38, at 123 (the most important economic effects of intellectual property may 
not be on price, but on industry structure). 
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characteristics. Because proxy signaling will operate dynamically, an 
industry that locks into socially unfavorable innovation practices will no 
longer present the desired characteristics and will cease to be one of the 
industries whose preferences are considered. 
2. Subindustry Diversity 
The analysis to this point has focused on the dominant firms within a 
given industry, both for purposes of characterizing the industry and as the 
primary coordinators of industry advocacy. The industries discussed here, 
however, are not homogenous. Various subindustries exist within each of 
the industries analyzed and these subindustries have characteristics and 
preferences that vary from other subindustries within the same industry. 
The biotechnology industry, for example, includes large 
biopharmaceutical firms that develop and commercialize biologics, small 
biotech start-ups, agricultural biotechnology companies, and a growing 
number of follow-on biologic manufacturers.
167
 The software industry 
contains consumer giants, software development companies who are the 
large firms‘ clients, and many smaller direct consumer firms.168 The 
semiconductor industry contains both fabrication and design firms.
169
 Each 
of these subindustries can have different innovation characteristics. In a 
related vein, there may be certain identifiable cross-industry subgroups. 
For example, start-up companies or individual inventors across a variety of 
industries may share certain innovation characteristics.
170
  
By disaggregating the broad industry categorizations to identify 
pertinent subindustry innovation characteristics, and analyzing the 
subindustry advocacy positions, the proxy methodology can be refined to 
produce more precise signals. Increasing the numerousity of entities 
evaluated increases the likelihood of identifying some that display socially 
desirable trade-offs across more characteristics. This process can 
strategically focus on those industries that already display many 
 
 
 167. BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION, About Bio, http://bio.org/aboutbio/ (last visited 
July 15, 2012). 
 168. See KARL M. POPP & RALF MEYER, PROFIT FROM SOFTWARE ECOSYSTEMS: BUSINESS 
MODELS, ECOSYSTEMS AND PARTNERSHIPS IN THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY (2010). 
 169. Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 96, at 107. 
 170. Some research indicates that large firms tend to focus their research and development 
activities on smaller and process-oriented innovations, while small firms tend to focus on more 
significant innovative advances concerning products, a difference that may be worth investigating with 
proxy analysis. P. A. GEROSKI, MARKET DYNAMICS AND ENTRY 220–22 (1991); Barnett, supra note 
30, at 1289 (collecting multiple studies); see Hunt & Nakamura, supra note 94, at 14 (reporting that 
younger, smaller firms are producing a rising share of industry research and development). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
50 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:1 
 
 
 
 
appropriate trade-offs. Certain sub-categories of the telecommunication, 
medical device, and semiconductor industries, for example, may display 
even more trade-offs that mirror society‘s than the industries as a whole. 
In this manner, a small collection of subindustries can be identified that 
are expected to display relatively socially equivalent trade-offs. Examining 
the preferences of this collection will both provide more precise proxy 
signals and serve as a check on any single group having been misanalyzed. 
This specification also helps explain recent factionization in the 
software industry. The software industry has historically been one of the 
strongest advocates for weakening patent protection, arguing for years in 
favor of patent reform and filing numerous amicus briefs, uniformly 
championing weaker rights.
171
 In the recent Supreme Court Bilski v. 
Kappos litigation, however, the industry split, with many large software 
companies still supporting weaker patent rights,
172
 but a number of smaller 
software firms filing amicus briefs in favor of broader, stronger rights.
173
 
While both large and small software companies share many innovation 
characteristics, they diverge in two significant respects: alternative 
appropriability mechanisms and being a net consumer versus net producer 
of innovation. As discussed above, large software firms tend to be net 
consumers of innovation, but smaller firms are often net producers—
producing the very software that the large firms commercialize. Similarly, 
large firms have greater means of appropriability outside of patent 
protection, including their brand name recognition and ability to bundle 
their innovation with other products and services.
174
 Consequently, small 
software firms are expected to have preferences for stronger patent 
protection than large firms. What started as a software industry unified in 
preference for weaker patent protection than the status quo has 
 
 
 171. E.g., Brief for American Innovators Alliance as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8, 
eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130) (brief joined by software companies 
advocating for weaker patent protection); Brief for the Business Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, KSR Int‘l v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-1350) (brief of 
software company industry organization advocating for weaker patent protections); Brief for Adobe 
Systems Incorporated et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, In Re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 
F.3d 1360 (2007) (No. 06-M830) (brief of software company advocating for weaker patent protection). 
 172. E.g., Brief for Microsoft et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, In re Bilski 129 S. 
Ct. 2735 (2009) (No. 08-964) (brief of large software company supporting weaker patent protection). 
 173. E.g., Brief for Borland Software Corporation in Support of Petitioners, In re Bilski, 129 S. 
Ct. 2735 (2009) (No. 08-964) (brief of small software company supporting stronger patent protection); 
Brief for Armanta et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, In re Bilski, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009) 
(No. 08-964) (brief of small software company supporting stronger patent protection). 
 174. Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of Strong Patent 
Protection: A Contribution to the Current Debate, 27 RES. POL‘Y 273, 274 (1998); Joseph M. 
Barnett, Is Intellectual Property Trivial, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1691, 1729 (2009). 
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factionalized as Supreme Court decisions have weakened the level of 
patent protection, leaving current patent law at a point somewhere between 
large software and small software firms‘ preferences. 
A particular challenge in selecting subindustries concerns ensuring that 
proxy signals maintain appropriate incentives for new firms to enter the 
innovation market. Proxy signals, by definition, will come from existing 
entities, and it is possible that patent law based on such signals may not 
provide the optimal environment for new entrants to enter the market 
because incumbents will desire a system of propertization that produces 
high barriers to entry. This concern can be substantially ameliorated by 
focusing on subindustries with socially equivalent characteristics that 
contain new entrant representatives and representatives that do not occupy 
positions of market strength in the given industry. 
3. Effects of Uniform Patent Law 
As noted above, patent law generally presents a one-size-fits-all legal 
regime.
175
 The optimal level of propertization, however, varies by industry 
due to variation in innovation characteristics.
176
 Not only does the 
pharmaceutical industry privately prefer stronger patent protection than the 
information technology industry, but it is also quite possible that the 
socially optimal level of propertization is higher for pharmaceuticals 
(though not necessarily as high as the industry itself desires). The variation 
in optimal patent law across industry raises two issues for proxy signal 
analysis: first, whether proxy analysis needs to be weighted by industry 
size, and second, whether the proxy approach can be applied to industry-
specific patent law. 
To evaluate the weighting issue, consider a world with only three 
industries, represented by the preference functions already presented in 
Figure 3. In this world, even though Industry C lies closest to the optimal 
social trade-offs, it is possible that Industry A is responsible for the vast 
majority of innovation in society. Even in this circumstance, however, we 
would still want patent law to account for the true exclusivity costs of 
 
 
 175. The patent system is not precisely uniform across industries—certain statutes are industry-
specific, and some judicial law arguably varies by industry as well. Kesselheim, supra note 48 
(discussing pharmaceutical specific patent laws, including the Hatch-Waxman Act); Dan Burk & Mark 
Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156 (2002) (arguing 
that the Federal Circuit provides different patent law for different industries). This variation, however, 
is sufficiently limited such that industries perceive largely uniform law. Long, supra note 83, at 48. 
 176. Lemley, supra note 129, at 150; see also Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1294 
(noting how patent law affects differently industries differently). 
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patenting, and following Industry C‘s patent law preferences would 
accomplish this goal. It is true that this may reduce Industry A‘s net 
incentives to innovate, but it will only reduce them to the socially optimal 
level. Stated another way, even if Industry A produces the dominant 
amount of innovation in society, we still want patent law that balances 
both the full incentives and the full exclusivity costs of that innovation.
177
  
Second, proxy analysis can be applied to signal socially beneficial, 
industry-specific patent law. The TRIPS Agreement, to which the United 
States is a signatory, effectively mandates uniform patent and copyright 
systems in certain regards, and long-standing public policy is in accord.
178
 
However, were patent law to evolve to vary by industry, proxy signaling 
could be used among subindustries within each industry in much the same 
manner as it is introduced at the industry level here. Subindustries with 
different innovation characteristics could be analyzed to identify those 
subindustries that present socially desirable trade-offs for innovation 
within the industry. Patent law for the particular industry could then be 
modeled based on the proxy subindustry‘s preferences. 
One of the primary critiques of industry-specific patent law is a 
concern about the increased opportunity for industry rent-seeking to set 
industry favorable patent laws.
179
 Proxy signal analysis provides a way 
beyond this challenge by presenting objective means to identify the 
appropriate level of propertization within each industry. As noted, proxy 
analysis presents a technique to differentiate private patent law preferences 
that arise from a desire for greater rank-seeking from those that are based 
on a desire to actually increase incentives to innovate. 
4. Measuring Industry Preferences 
The proxy signals methodology assumes both that private industry will 
know its own preferences and that these preferences are identifiable. If, for 
example, the pharmaceutical industry is incorrect that stronger patent 
protection would be internally beneficial, this would send an inaccurate 
 
 
 177. Furthermore, in the United States, none of the innovation industries discussed represents such 
a dominant position in innovation overall that weighting would become necessary. See, e.g., BUREAU 
OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, INDUSTRY ECONOMIC ACCOUNTS (2012), 
available at http://www.bea.gov/industry/ (providing a wealth of data on the sizes of various industries 
in the United States, indicating that none of the industries discussed here represent a dominant 
position). 
 178. Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 
I.L.M. 81 (1984). 
 179. Long, supra note 83, at 48; Wagner, supra note 86. 
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signal that the proxy approach would not be able to filter. The industries 
discussed here are highly sophisticated and wealthy actors that spend vast 
resources on innovation and have the best information available 
concerning the relationship between innovation and patent protection. In 
addition, focusing on industry and subindustry groups, rather than 
individual firms, reduces the probability of receiving inaccurate signals.
180
 
It is highly likely that these private entities will have a sufficiently 
accurate sense of their own industry innovation preferences.
181
 In 
particular, this private industry knowledge is the best knowledge that 
society can expect to acquire on these matters. 
Further, in most cases, lawmakers should be able to identify industry 
preferences sufficiently to gather valuable information from proxy signals. 
The industries discussed here spend billions of dollars on intellectual 
property advocacy.
182
 This advocacy, in the form of legislative and 
executive branch lobbying, judicial litigation efforts, and industry position 
papers and statements, is often public. Although certain lobbying takes 
place behind closed doors, the recent spate of patent cases before the 
Supreme Court and various patent reform legislation efforts have left a 
well-documented trail of amicus briefs and lobbying activity in which 
each of the industries discussed here has taken positions on multiple 
issues, producing a valuable public record. Conventional wisdom is that 
the signals from industry‘s advocacy efforts are not informative because 
they are too noisy, as it is impossible to separate their self-interested 
private interests from the social interest. The proxy approach provides a 
unique noise reduction method to extract the desired signal. 
From this perspective, proxy signal analysis may be viewed as a more 
modest political proposal than it first appears. Legislators have long asked 
pertinent private industry actors for their opinions on how a particular 
 
 
 180. See HADFIELD, supra note 17, at 23 (discussing the superiority of private markets for 
accurately processing information). 
 181. That said, both agency and behavioral concerns certainly can prevent firms from promoting 
their own best interests. Agency effects could lead private decision-makers within firms to act in their 
own best interests, rather than the firm‘s. Separately, the bounded rationality of human decision-
making means that even well-meaning individuals may not act in the optimal manner to achieve their 
own preferences. Camerer, supra note 49. The study of the behavioral economics among groups is less 
developed than for individuals; in certain situations, group decision-making may tend to attenuate 
certain effects of bounded rationality. Id. at 14–16; Gregory M. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: 
Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1391, 1414 (2006). Even where a firm misunderstands its own preferences, however, it is still 
likely to have better information than public entities. Further, focusing on subindustries should help 
ameliorate some of these concerns. 
 182. Lindsay R. Mayer, Drug Makers Cash in on Lobbying Efforts, OPENSECRETSBLOG: 
INVESTIGATING MONEY IN POLITICS (June 18, 2009); Kesan & Gallo, supra note 54, at 1359. 
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legislative proposal might affect them and whether they support it. In 
current practice, wealthy and powerful interests often have access 
advantages and routinely drown out competing voices to obtain 
inappropriate influence.
183
 A perhaps lucky facet of recent patent reform 
debates is that powerful industries have lined up against each other on 
opposing sides of many disputes.
184
 This face-off has produced a 
significant degree of deadlock on patent legislation. In copyright, where 
this has not been the case, several copyright industries have successfully 
lobbied for increasingly stronger protection,
185
 though the recent 
legislative confrontation concerning the Stop Online Piracy Act
186
 (SOPA) 
and the Protect IP Act
187
 (PIPA) indicates that the long history of industry 
uniformity in the copyright context may be shifting. In each case, 
however, just because an industry is wealthy or powerful hardly means 
that that it will tend to advocate for laws in the social interest. Proxy 
analysis provides a different public choice framework to identify which 
private entities public lawmakers should listen to. Rather than selecting 
influence based on resources and access, proxy analysis proposes selecting 
influence based upon how likely it is that certain advocacy accurately 
reflects societal objectives.
188
 
One way to envision operationalizing the proxy approach would be to 
place the burden on an advocate to demonstrate both that it accurately 
reflects a particular industry‘s position and that the industry faces similar 
trade-offs to society as a whole. This information-forcing approach
189
 
would produce great incentives for industry to divulge previously private 
information about the relationship between innovation and intellectual 
property law. Obviously, industry actors would have incentives to only 
disclose advantageous information, but this would still be a start. Proxy 
 
 
 183. LIBECAP, supra note 54, at 27 (noting that the political influence of private parties depends 
in part on their wealth); Kesan & Gallo, supra note 54 (discussing the effects of wealth and power on 
lobbying with respect to patent legislation). 
 184. E.g., Kesan & Gallo, supra note 54, at 1347–57; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 13, at 4. 
 185. See Paula Baron, Symposium: Interdisciplinary Conference on the Impact of Technological 
Change on the Creation, Dissemination, and Protection of Intellectual Property: The Moebius Strip: 
Private Right and Public use in Copyright Law, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1227, 1245 (2007). 
 186. H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 187. S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 188. In this regard, proxy signals could produce efficiency savings in lobbying efforts. Instead of 
the current system that effectively makes lobbying power a function of resources—incentivizing a 
lobbying arms race, proxy signals would allow for a reduction in lobbying efforts, saving resources 
that could instead be used to finance greater innovation activity. 
 189. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA. ST. L. 
REV. 861 (2006) (discussing how environmental regulations can be structured to provide industry 
incentives to disclose private information). 
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signals present valuable means to begin to parse the complex political 
economy of intellectual property law. 
5. Selecting Innovation Characteristics 
One concern with proxy analysis may be that it appears to be circular 
in a certain respect: If we know what the social or legal objective is in the 
first instance, why not just implement it directly? The answer to this 
concern is that there is a significant difference between knowing what the 
social or legal objective is and being able to design laws to produce it. It is 
one thing to recognize that intellectual property law should balance the 
incentive benefits and exclusivity costs of protection in order to optimize 
incentives to innovate. It is another thing to know what particular laws will 
achieve this balance. Proxy signal analysis is based on the realization that 
it is easier to identify subindustries that, due to their technological and 
innovation characteristics, face equivalent trade-offs to society than it is to 
parse the relationship between patent law and innovation directly. This is 
not to claim that proxy signals will produce perfectly optimal law—there 
undoubtedly will be noise and distortions in the signals—but that the 
signals can provide better information than is currently available 
concerning socially preferable patent law.  
Proxy signal analysis depends on accurately selecting the industry 
characteristics that are most pertinent to patent propertization preferences, 
and on accurately evaluating the relationship between these industry 
characteristics and societal innovation trade-offs. These assumptions 
appear substantially feasible for patent law, though this conclusion may 
vary in other fields. The industry characteristics examined here for 
innovation industries are well-recognized and have been well-studied over 
the past decade.
190
 Similarly, the inferences drawn from them have either 
been empirically investigated or appear relatively straightforward.
191
 With 
that said, the list of characteristics discussed here may be incomplete, and 
there may be some disagreement concerning how particular characteristics 
are evaluated.
192
 As patent proxy analysis advances, greater expertise in 
 
 
 190. See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 13; BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 23, at 120–64, 
187–214; Burk & Lemley, supra note 6. 
 191. See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 13; BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 23, at 120–64, 
187–214; Burk & Lemley, supra note 6. 
 192. For example, while we desire patent law to take into account the social waste of duplicate 
development costs, this would be a difficult balance to achieve. Firms take into account a proxy for 
such costs in considering their likelihood of prevailing in a patent race, but identifying the optimal 
level of competition from a patent race perspective presents a very complex question. See, e.g., Ted M. 
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the form of additional empirical data and particular industry experts could 
be brought to bear on these issues. Such expertise would be particularly 
valuable as the method is refined to apply to smaller subindustries. 
An additional advantage of proxy signaling is that it would be hard for 
an industry to game the system. A great challenge in many legal debates is 
the informational asymmetry that exists because private actors often 
possess the greatest information concerning the likely effects of any legal 
change, but are incentivized to selectively disclose and portray that 
information in a light most favorable to their own interests.
193
 In 
intellectual property law, private industry has the strongest information 
concerning the relationship between innovation and intellectual property 
law, but incentives only to portray the information in the manner most 
favorable to the industry‘s intellectual property wishes. Industry 
innovation characteristics, however, are information that generally is not 
confidential and that would be extremely difficult to manipulate. In 
particular, such information is both more publicly available and easier to 
evaluate than industry information on the relationship between innovation 
and intellectual property law. Similarly, because proxy signaling is based 
on identifying industries where interests align with society‘s there would 
be little reason for any selected industry to strategically game its advocacy. 
It will be in the identified industries‘ own self-interest to accurately 
disclose their information and preferences.
194
 Certainly, industries that do 
not present socially optimal trade-offs will try to argue that they possess 
different characteristics. It is far easier, however, for public policy-makers 
to see through such charades and evaluate publicly available industry 
characteristics than it is to divine asymmetrically hidden private 
innovation information.  
 
 
Sichelman, Quantum Game Theory and Coordination in Intellectual Property (2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1656625; John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect 
Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439 (2004). 
 193. Wendy Wagner & David Michaels, Equal Treatment for Regulatory Science: Extending the 
Controls Governing the Quality of Public Research to Private Research, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 119, 
148 (2004); David Dana, When Less Liability May Mean More Precaution: The Case of 
Nanotechnology, 28 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y 153, 159 (2010). 
 194. That said, industries with non-optimal innovation characteristics could try to bribe industries 
with optimal characteristics. This is particularly a risk to the extent that an industry with optimal 
characteristics represents a small share of the innovation market, rendering it less expensive to pay-off. 
In addition to potential fraud and other civil and criminal liability, there are other means to mitigate 
such concerns. For example, multiple sub-industries can be used as checks, and implementation of 
proxy signaling need not involve full transparency in the industry identification process. 
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6. Extraterritorial Innovation 
The analysis presented to this point assumes a closed system of 
innovation. That is, a system in which there is no net inflow of innovation 
from another jurisdiction or net outflow to another jurisdiction. In reality, 
United States industry both relies on innovation produced outside the 
jurisdiction and profits by selling its own innovation extraterritorially. A 
society that is a heavy net consumer of external innovation would be 
expected to favor low levels of intellectual property propertization, 
preferring to take advantage of the positive externalities of innovation 
produced by others. This is one of several reasons that less developed 
countries may often favor weaker intellectual property rights regimes.
195
 
Such countries prefer to piggyback on others‘ innovations, but have 
limited technological innovation of their own from which they could 
derive benefit through intellectual propertization. The proxy approach, 
therefore, would not produce accurate results for a jurisdiction that is a 
significant net consumer of innovation. 
The converse, however, is not true. A society that is a heavy net 
producer of innovation, which can be commercialized extraterritorially, 
will not favor artificially high domestic intellectual property protection 
because intellectual property laws are national. Having stronger United 
States patent law will not help American industry profit from foreign 
innovation sales because the ability to profit from innovation overseas 
largely depends on foreign countries‘ intellectual property laws, not 
domestic laws.
196
 This circumstance may (and apparently does) cause 
domestic industry to advocate for stronger patent protection abroad, but 
not domestically.
197
 To the extent United States industry is either neutral in 
its production of innovation, or is a net producer of innovation, the 
methodology presented here will hold. This presumption is supported by 
substantial empirical evidence.
198
 
 
 
 195. Eric Ford & Nicholas Taylor, Free and Open Source Software in Developing Countries, 17 
U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 139 (2009). 
 196. It is theoretically possible that stronger United States law could be used as a basis to argue 
for stronger intellectual property protection abroad, and therefore that industries may advocate for 
stronger United States protection than they would in the absence of the opportunity to profit 
extraterritorially. This possibility could be resolved by analyzing the net consumption/production of 
innovation characteristic to account for external production. 
 197. See Susan K. Sell, TRIPS was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAs, ACTA, and 
TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447 (2011) (discussing U.S. policy of steadily pushing for stronger 
intellectual property protection in foreign countries). 
 198. Robert D. Atkinson & Daniel D. Castro, A National Technology Agenda for the New 
Administration, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 190 (2008). 
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7. Real World Limitations 
Finally, there may be one unavoidable limit to the proxy signal 
approach. Because proxy analysis relies on the characteristics of real 
world industries, it is limited by the availability of industries with given 
characteristics. No industry (or subindustry) is likely to precisely mirror 
optimal social trade-offs between incentives and exclusivity.
199
 As a result, 
no industry will produce a perfect signal. Ironically, this limitation arises 
because the real world is not complex enough—precisely the opposite of 
the problem that has plagued prior analysis. The more heterogeneous 
industries and subindustries are, the more useful information can be 
derived from proxy signals. 
Even without a single ideal industry or subindustry, we can still obtain 
valuable signals. For subindustries with many socially equivalent trade-off 
characteristics, but certain nonequivalent ones, we usually will be able to 
detect the direction of the bias caused by the nonequivalent characteristics. 
By engaging in this exercise for multiple subindustries with nearly 
equivalent characteristics, it will be possible to combine this information 
to home in on a socially preferable level of patent propertization. Though 
the final results will not be perfect, they can provide far superior 
information than is currently available concerning socially optimal rights, 
based on the best existing public and private resources and information. 
Unlike conventional law and economics analysis, which makes 
numerous simplifying assumptions about real world innovation in order to 
try to identify socially optimal levels of propertization, proxy signal 
analysis recognizes real world complexity as an unalterable given, and 
employs this heterogeneity as a previously untapped goldmine that can be 
leveraged for insight into socially preferable legal regimes. Where most 
prior economic analysis deals with trying to design a hypothetical ideal 
version of patent law in the abstract,
200
 the proxy technique is concerned 
 
 
 199. Even industries that align with social preferences on most or all innovation characteristics 
may still differ from societal objectives in certain regards, such as biases for short-term over long-term 
returns, against uncertainty, or for appropriable types of innovation. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 
128 (discussing corporate biases towards short-term goals). Attention to industry characteristics, 
however, can mitigate at least some of these biases. For example, industries with longer development 
time periods can be considered to assure that proxy signaling takes into account long-term incentive 
preferences.  
 200. E.g., Bessen & Maskin, supra note 46; Hunt, supra note 46; Dasgupta & Stiglitz, supra note 
46; Scotchmer, supra note 41; Merges & Nelson, supra note 30; Kitch, supra note 45. Some empirical 
economic work attempts to evaluate whether current patent law is stronger or weaker than the optimal 
level, but can only identify a direction and not how far the law is from the ideal. 
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with how to modify law in relation to the status quo, a more practical 
result for real world decision-making. 
In this manner, the proxy method provides a partial solution to the 
public-good market failure problem in patent law. Because innovation is a 
public good, there is a well-recognized failure of the market to provide 
accurate signals concerning how much innovation consumers desire.
201
 
While quantity demand can be used to signal the intensity of consumer 
preferences for most goods, this mechanism does not work for public 
goods.
202
 In addition, there often is no way to use prices to signal 
consumer preferences because consumers have incentives to understate 
their preferences in this regard (so as to free ride at a lower price).
203
 Thus, 
society needs an alternative mechanism to identify how much of a public 
good to produce. 
Proxy signaling can provide this method. Rather than trying to identify 
the optimal quantity of innovation to produce directly, it may be possible 
to do so through proxies. An industry that faces the same innovation trade-
offs as society as a whole will tend, as described above, to prefer a socially 
beneficial level of innovation incentives. Molding patent law consistent 
with the preferences of such an industry should produce a socially 
appropriate level of incentives, to a first order approximation, even though 
we are not able to measure consumer quantity demand or pricing 
preferences directly. This effectively occurs because an industry that faces 
the socially desired trade-offs between incentives and exclusivity is 
actually both a producer and a consumer of innovation. In playing both 
roles, such entities will necessarily take the true intensity of their own 
consumer preferences into account.
204
 
 
 
 201. FRISCHMANN, supra note 39, at 53–57; John P. Conley & Christopher S. Yoo, Nonrivalry 
and Price Discrimination in Copyright Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1801, 1810 (2009); Paul A. 
Samuelson, A Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954). Public goods 
are traditionally defined as goods that are nonexcludable (cannot be provided to one without providing 
them to all) and nonrivalrous (consumption by one does not reduce the available supply). Conley & 
Yoo, supra note 201, at 1805. Absent intellectual property protection, innovation is a public good 
because it is nonexcludable and nonrivalrous. 
 202. Id. at 1808–10. The indivisibility of public goods, in the sense that the quantity of the goods 
produced can vary, but every consumer will consume the entire output, means that quantity generally 
cannot be used to identify the intensity of consumer preferences. Id.; Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic 
Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE 
ACTIVITY 609 (Richard Nelson ed., 1962). 
 203. Conley & Yoo, supra note 201, at 1810. Note that even if a producer can exclude consumers 
(as with intellectual property protection), the producer still will not know how much to charge 
consumers. 
 204. As noted above, optimizing innovation is not necessarily the same as optimizing social 
welfare, which is why the signaling method is not a complete solution to the public good problem. 
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CONCLUSION 
The proxy signal methodology introduced here presents a new way to 
think about public choice and social welfare analysis. Rather than relying 
on an improbable hope that public actors will be all-knowing about the 
interaction between patent law and innovation, proxy analysis provides 
concrete means to capture collective information through a form of fine-
tuned crowd-sourcing to take advantage of the vast warehouse of private 
and market knowledge concerning innovation. This approach can be 
generalized beyond its initial application here, in certain contexts, to take 
into account equitable concerns and to apply to other legal domains 
beyond patent law. 
A common concern with traditional law and economics approaches to 
legal issues is the primary focus on efficiency.
205
 Numerous commentators 
have critiqued the goal of trying to achieve the most efficient allocation of 
resources for its distributional agnosticism and failure to take into account 
equitable concerns.
206
 Though the proxy methodology is developed in the 
context of the efficiency trade-off between incentives and exclusivity, this 
approach can be managed in certain circumstances to pursue equitable 
objectives as well. Preferred equitable objectives can be sought in the 
same manner as described above—by selecting appropriate characteristics. 
In the context of patent law, for example, particular innovation 
characteristics may lead private actors to prefer certain types of innovation 
over others, which may have social consequences. For example, to the 
extent there is concern that the patent system incentivizes firms to produce 
innovation that excessively benefits wealthier economic classes, while not 
incentivizing enough innovation that is beneficial to those who are less 
well off, proxy analysis could be used to adjust incentives by selecting 
proxies that accord with particular social objectives.
207
 
Proxy signal methodology may also be applied beyond patent law to 
other legal domains where there are generally agreed upon normative 
goals but widespread disagreement concerning how to achieve those goals. 
 
 
 205. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11–15 (7th ed. 2007) 
(noting that ―efficiency . . . has limitations as an ethical criterion for decisionmaking‖ and discussing 
other objections to utilitarianism); AVERY W. KATZ, FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO 
LAW 344–409 (1998) (presenting a series of critiques to an utilitarian economic approach to law). 
 206. See, e.g., James R. Hackney Jr., Law and Neoclassical Economics Theory: A Critical History 
of the Distribution/Efficiency Debate, 32 J. SOCIO-ECON. 361 (2003) (tracing the history of the 
distributional critique of law and economics); POSNER, supra note 205, at 11–15 (discussing the 
―limitations [of efficiency] as an ethical criterion of social decisionmaking‖). 
 207. Dan Hunter, Culture War, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (2005). 
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The application of proxy analysis is context-dependent, requiring 
situations where varied private actors both possess superior information to 
society on how to balance certain trade-offs and where such private 
entities can be objectively evaluated to identify those facing similar trade-
offs to society. Successful proxy analysis also requires that private entities 
possess diverse characteristics that have traceable effects on varying 
positions with respect to the law and that interests on each side of an issue 
are sufficiently concentrated so as to send a signal. 
Copyright law presents a potentially fruitful area for future proxy 
analysis.
208
 The copyright market includes a wide diversity of industries 
for study, including motion pictures, music recording, publishers, 
broadcasters, the Internet, and visual and graphic arts. These industries 
possess different innovation and market characteristics, just as with the 
patent industries, which can be evaluated with respect to the social 
equivalence of trade-offs. Copyright proxy analysis would be more 
complicated than patent due to the greater debate over non-utilitarian 
objectives, particularly first amendment and moral rights.
209
 But, copyright 
law would also provide a potentially intriguing counterpoint to patent 
analysis in several regards, including concerning certain software and 
information technology industries that generally desire weak patent rights 
but stronger copyright protection. 
Proxy analysis could apply to certain issues in other areas of private 
and public law. For example, some areas of contract law involve private 
entities that regularly encounter the trade-off between the benefit of 
contract law protection and the cost of others exercising their contract 
rights. In certain of these cases, private preferences will depend upon 
identifiable industry characteristics, such as the propensity for breach in 
the industry, whether the industry is diffuse or concentrated, and levels of 
contract enforcement in the industry, which could be mined for proxy 
information.
210
 In a different vein, the current debate over greater financial 
regulation in the wake of the recent economic crisis has exposed a number 
 
 
 208. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989) (―Striking the correct balance between access and incentives is 
the central problem in copyright law.‖). 
 209. See, e.g., Amy M. Alder, Against Moral Rights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 263 (2009) (discussing the 
moral rights debate in copyright law). 
 210. Note that application of proxy signals in contract law is different from contract default rules, 
which are based on allocating rights in the manner the parties would have tended to agree to ex ante. 
POSNER, supra note 205, at 97, 99 (7th ed. 2007). Proxy signaling recognizes that following average 
private party tendencies may not produce a socially optimal result, and instead relies on selecting 
particular private parties whose preferences are expected to mirror society‘s. 
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of rifts within the financial industry concerning different preferences for 
financial reform and financial regulation. Various parts of the financial 
industry have taken different positions on issues ranging from mortgage 
reform to proprietary trading restrictions and the establishment of the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
211
 These varied positions are likely 
produced in part by differing industry characteristics, which could be 
studied and evaluated in order to better understand the merit of various 
reform proposals from a social perspective. 
Proxy signal methodology thus presents a new technique for addressing 
a central question in many areas of law: how to identify the socially 
optimal balance among competing trade-offs. Parsing private industry 
characteristics to select proxies who face similar trade-offs to society 
allows us to identify private parties who are expected, for self-interested 
reasons, to advocate for socially beneficial balances in law. These private 
parties‘ actions can be mined to bring extensive private financial and 
informational resources that have never been captured before to bear on 
complex legal issues. Though necessarily stylized for purposes of 
development in this article, proxy signal analysis introduces a powerful 
new form of law and economics that can leverage the real world 
complexity of heterogeneous actors pursuing their own best interests in a 
manner to identify socially beneficial legal regimes. 
 
 
 211. Compare ABA STATEMENT ON HOUSE PASSAGE OF DODD-FRANK BILL (June 30, 2010), 
available at http://www.aba.com/Press+Room/063010HousePassageDoddFrankBill.htm (American 
Bankers Association criticizing proposed Dodd-Frank Act concerning financial regulatory reform, 
stating ―This bill will do severe damage to traditional banks and to Main Street‖), with RYAN 
STATEMENT ON ENACTMENT OF DODD-FRANK ACT (July 21, 2010), available at http:// 
www.sifma.org/news/news.aspx?id=17722 (Securities Industry and Financial Markets Organization 
supporting passage of Dodd-Frank Act as ―an important step forward for America‘s financial markets 
and its economy‖). 
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